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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue subject to this appeal is whether Nevada 
Power Company may refuse to produce to Arco Coal Sales Company 
and Beaver Creek Coal Company transcripts of depositions taken 
by Trail Mountain Coal Company of officers and employees of 
Nevada Power Company in a related federal lawsuit, which 
transcripts are within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P., on 
the ground that the deposition transcripts are the work product 
of Nevada Power Company13 counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail Mountain") 
initiated this lawsuit against Arco Coal Sales Company ("Arco") 
and Beaver Creek Coal Company ("Beaver Creek") on April 4, 
1986c Trail Mountain alleges that Beaver Creek breached a coal 
supply contract entered into between Beaver Creek and Trail 
Mountain (the "Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract"), which 
provides that Beaver Creek will purchase from Trail Mountain a 
certain quantity of coal over a period of years. Trail 
Mountain claims that Beaver Creek breached that contract by 
refusing to purchase the coal. Trail Mountain further alleges 
that Arco wrongfully induced Beaver Creek to breach the Beaver 
Creek-Trail Mountain Contract. Trail Mountain seeks 
compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $36,000,000 from 
Arco and Beaver Creek. 
Arco and Beaver Creek have denied liability and 
contend that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract was 
repudiated and cancelled by Trail Mountain by its failure to 
give assurance, after proper demand by Beaver Creek, that the 
coal would satisfy the quality requirements of that contract. 
In addition, Arco and Beaver Creek filed a Third-Party 
Complaint against Nevada Power Company ("NPC") in which it is 
alleged that if Arco or Beaver Creek is found liable to Trail 
Mountain, NPC is obligated to indemnify Arco or Beaver Creek 
against that liability. NPC's obligations to Arco and Beaver 
Creek arise out of the interrelationship of NPC, Trail 
Mountain, Beaver Creek and Arco and the contracts existing 
between the parties, as hereafter explained. 
2. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition 
By District Court 
This matter presently is before the Court on 
interlocutory appeal from an order denying Arco and Beaver 
Creek's motion to compel production by NPC of transcripts of 
depositions taken by Trail Mountain of NPC witnesses in a 
related federal lawsuit. Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Nevada 
Power Co., Civil No. C-84-0686G ("the federal action"). In 
response to an informal request from Arco and Beaver Creek, 
The transcript of the argument on the Motion to 
Compel is paginated separately and is cited herein as Tr. Motion 
to Compel. All other citations to the record are designated R. 
Q_ 
Trail Mountain voluntarily provided copies of the transcripts 
of its witnesses' depositions. (Tr. Motion to Compel at 11). 
NPC, however, refused to provide copies of the transcripts of 
its witnesses' depositions. (R. 293). Consequently, Arco and 
Beaver Creek made a formal request for production pursuant to 
Rule 34, U.R.C.P. (R. 284). NPC objected to Arco and Beaver 
Creek's request on the grounds that the deposition transcripts 
are work product. (R. 346, 359). Arco and Beaver Creek then 
filed a motion to compel, (R. 287), that was argued before the 
district court on November 17, 1986. (Tr. Motion to Compel). 
On November 24, 1986, the district court issued its Ruling On 
Motion for Production of Documents denying Arco and Beaver 
Creek's motion. (R. 372-74). 
By order dated January 28, 1987, this Court granted 
Arco and Beaver Creek's Motion for Leave to File an 
Interlocutory Appeal. Arco and Beaver Creek filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition on March 2, 1987. The motion was denied by 
Order dated April 8, 1987. 
3. Statement Of Relevant Facts 
The Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract at issue in 
this action is one of three related coal supply contracts 
involving Beaver Creek, Trail Mountain and NPC. The 
relationship between these contracts establishes the context in 
which the pending dispute arose. 
The Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract provides that 
Trail Mountain will sell 120,000 tons of coal per year to 
Beaver Creek for a period of fifteen years. (R. 74-75). The 
Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract explicitly states that NPC 
is the ultimate consumer of the coal to be supplied by Trail 
Mountain to Beaver Creek under that contract. (R. 86). As a 
result of that fact, the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract 
requires the coal supplied by Trail Mountain to be "of a 
quality satisfactory for use in the coal fired units of the 
Reid Gardner Station of the Nevada Power Company." (R. 76). 
As contemplated under the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain 
Contract, Beaver Creek entered into a separate contract with 
NPC ("the Beaver Creek-NPC Contract"), which provides that 
Beaver Creek will sell 275,000 tons of coal per year to NPC for 
a period of fifteen years. (R. 40). The Beaver Creek-NPC 
Contract expressly provides that Trail Mountain may be one 
source of the coal to be supplied by Beaver Creek to NPC under 
that contract. (R. 42). The Beaver Creek-NPC Contract also 
provides that the coal sold to NPC "shall be of a quality 
satisfactory for use in the coal fired units of the Reid 
Gardner Station." (R. 43). 
The third related contract was between Trail Mountain 
and NPC (the "Trail Mountain-NPC Contract"), and provided that 
Trial Mountain would sell 300,000 tons per year of coal to NPC 
for a period of fifteen years. (R. 22, 23). The Trail 
-S-
Mountain-NPC Contract required the Trail Mountain coal to meet 
certain specific quality characteristics, including a 
requirement that the coal contain a maximum of three percent 
sodium oxide in the ash. (R. 24). 
On March 20, 1984, NPC, by letter, notified Trail 
Mountain that NPC was suspending further deliveries under the 
Trail Mountain-NPC Contract because the coal delivered by Trail 
Mountain did not satisfy the sodium oxide limit contained in 
the contract. (R. 10, 13, 108). NPC claimed that the 
excessive sodium oxide in Trail Mountain's coal was causing 
operational problems at NPC?s Reid Gardner Station. NPC 
informed Beaver Creek of its suspension of deliveries under the 
Trail Mountain-NPC Contract by letter dated March 22, 1984. 
(R. 109). 
After receiving the notice of suspension from NPC, 
Beaver Creek, pursuant to Section 70A-2-609, Utah Code Ann., 
demanded adequate assurance from Trail Mountain that the coal 
supplied by Trail Mountain to Beaver Creek would be 
satisfactory for use in NPCfs Reid Gardner Station, as 
specifically required under the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain 
Contract. The demand was made on May 9, 1984. (R. 11, 131). 
Trail Mountain did not provide any assurance to Beaver Creek, 
as required by Section 70A-2-609. The Beaver Creek-Trail 
Mountain Contract therefore was repudiated by Trail Mountain 
and was terminated,, (R. 131). In August 1984, NPC 
terminated the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract due to Trail 
Mountain's failure to correct the sodium oxide problem. In 
response, Trail Mountain initiated the federal action against 
NPC. (R. 13). In the federal action, Trail Mountain alleged 
that NPC had breached the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract by 
3 
refusing to accept delivery of coal under that contract. In 
response to Trail Mountain's Complaint, NPC reiterated its 
claims that Trail Mountain's coal failed to satisfy the sodium 
Section 70A-2-609 permits a party to a contract to 
demand adequate assurance of due performance when "reasonable 
grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance" of 
another party to the contract. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-609(1) 
(1977). The party demanding assurance may suspend performance 
of the contract "if commercially reasonable." Id. If the 
party from whom assurance has been demanded fails to respond 
within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days, the failure 
constitutes a repudiation of the contract. Id. § 70A-2-609(4). 
3 
Complaint ITU 25, 26. A copy of the Complaint 
filed by Trail Mountain in the federal action is appended hereto 
as Appendix 1. Pursuant to Rule 201(d), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Arco and Beaver Creek request that the Court take judicial 
notice of the existence of the federal action and of the 
allegations made by the parties to that proceeding. Although 
these matters are not part of the record, matters such as these 
may be judicially noticed and considered by an appellate court. 
4 Am Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 492 (1962). Arco and Beaver 
Creek are not asking the Court to accept the veracity of the 
allegations made in the federal action, but only to take notice 
of the fact that NPC, Trail Mountain and Atlantic Richfield 
Company took certain positions or made certain allegations in 
that action. 
"7 
oxide requirement of the contract. In addition NPC alleged 
that the quality problems with the Trail Mountain coal had 
caused operating problems at its Reid Gardner Station. NPC 
sought damages from Trail Mountain of $64,000 for each day that 
a Reid Gardner Station unit was shutdown due to problems caused 
by Trail Mountain coal. 
In March 1985, Trail Mountain filed an Amended 
Complaint naming Atlantic Richfield Company, Arco and Beaver 
Creek's parent corporation, as a defendant. Trail Mountain 
repeated its allegations against NPC and further alleged that 
Atlantic Richfield Company had breached the Beaver Creek-Trail 
o 
Mountain Contract. NPCfs responsive pleading to the Amended 
Complaint reasserted the factual defenses and claims raised in 
Answer and Counterclaim 11 10 at 4; 11 21 at 8. A 
copy of the Answer and Counterclaim filed by NPC in the federal 
action is appended hereto as Appendix 2. Arco and Beaver Creek 
request the Court to take judicial notice of NPCfs Answer and 
Counterclaim to the extent and on the basis set forth in note 
3, supra. 
Answer and Counterclaim 1TU 4, 5 at 21. 
Answer and Counterclaim ITU 19, 22 at 26-27, 11 5 
at 30. 
A copy of the Amended Complaint filed by Trail 
Mountain in the federal action is appended hereto as Appendix 
3. Arco and Beaver Creek request the Court to take judicial 
notice of Trail Mountain's Amended Complaint to the extent and 
on the basis set forth in note 3, supra. 
g 
Amended Complaint IT 52. 
_ Q _ 
NPC's Answer and also alleged that NPC "reasonably determined" 
that the Trail Mountain coal did not comply with the quality 
9 
requirements of the Beaver Creek-NPC Contract. Atlantic 
Richfield Company moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint 
because Beaver Creek was the real party in interest. Since 
adding Beaver Creek as a party would destroy the basis for 
federal jurisdiction over the case, Trail Mountain filed a 
motion to drop Atlantic Richfield Company as a defendant. 
Neither Atlantic Richfield Company's motion to dismiss, nor 
Trail Mountain's motion to drop a party was heard by or ruled 
upon by the federal court. Instead, after some discovery had 
been completed, including the taking of the depositions at 
issue on this appeal, Trail Mountain and NPC settled their 
dispute and Trail Mountain's claims against Atlantic Richfield 
Amended Answer to Amended Complaint and Amended 
Counterclaim IT 25 at 11-12; IT 56 at 21; IT IT 4, 5 at 26-27; 1T 24 
at 34 and 11 16 at 40. A copy of NPC's Amended Answer to 
Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim is appended hereto 
as Appendix 4. Arco and Beaver Creek request the Court to take 
judicial notice of NPC's amended pleading to the extent and on 
the basis set forth in note 3, supra. 
Copies of Trail Mountain's Motion to Drop 
Defendant Atlantic Richfield and its Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Drop Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company 
are appended hereto as Appendices 5 and 6, respectively. Arco 
and Beaver Creek request the Court to take judicial notice of 
Trail Mountain's motion and memorandum to the extent and on the 
basis set forth in note 3, supra. 
_a_ 
Company were dismissed without prejudice. 
As part of their settlement agreement, Trail Mountain 
and NPC entered into a new coal supply contract (the "Trail 
Mountain-NPC Restated Contract") under which NPC agreed to 
purchase additional coal from Trail Mountain. (R. 13). In 
addition, the Trail Mountain-NPC Restated Contract does not 
contain the three percent limit on sodium oxide in the ash 
found in the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract. (R. 13). Trail 
Mountain has been delivering and NPC has been accepting 
delivery of coal from Trail Mountain under the Trail 
Mountain-NPC Restated Contract. Beaver Creek and Arco do not 
know why NPC apparently changed its prior position that the 
Trail Mountain coal was not satisfactory for use at the Reid 
Gardner Station and now has contracted to purchase additional 
Trail Mountain coal. 
Following the settlement of the federal action, Trail 
Mountain filed this lawsuit against Beaver Creek and Arco 
alleging that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract was 
terminated improperly. (R. 15). In response, Beaver Creek and 
Arco contend that they reasonably demanded assurance of due 
performance from Trail Mountain based on NPCfs representations 
Copies of the Stipulation of Dismissal and the 
Order of Dismissal are appended hereto as Appendices 7 and 8, 
respectively. Arco and Beaver Creek request the Court to take 
judicial notice of the Stipulation and Order to the extent and 
on the basis set forth in note 3, supra. 
that Trail Mountain coal contained excessive sodium oxide and 
was not satisfactory for use at NPCfs Reid Gardner Station, and 
that the failure of Trail Mountain to give any assurance 
constituted a repudiation and cancellation of the Beaver 
Creek-Trail Mountain Contract as provided in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-609(4). (R. 119). In addition, Arco and Beaver Creek 
have joined NPC as a third-party defendant on the grounds that 
NPC is obligated to indemnify Arco and Beaver Creek against any 
judgment awarded to Trail Mountain. (R. 128). The quality of 
Trail Mountain coal and whether it was satisfactory for use at 
NPC's Reid Gardner Station are pivotal issues in this lawsuit 
as well as the federal action. 
In the federal action, NPC took the position that the 
Trial Mountain coal was not satisfactory for use at the Reid 
12 Gardner Station. Since NPC has resumed deliveries of Trail 
Mountain coal to its Reid Gardner Station, NPC now apparently 
takes a different position and no longer asserts that the Trail 
Mountain coal is not satisfactory for use at its Reid Gardner 
Station. Both Trail Mountain and NPC have copies of the 
transcripts of the depositions of NPCfs officers and employees 
sought by Arco and Beaver Creek. Those deposition transcripts 
obviously contain relevant information concerning the use of 
Answer and Counterclaim 11 21 at 8; 11 5 at 30. 
_ i i _ 
Trail Mountain coal at NPC's Reid Gardner Station. In 
addition, they may contain dispositive testimony concerning 
whether or not Trail Mountain coal was satisfactory for use at 
the Reid Gardner Station and NPC's apparent change of position 
concerning that subject. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Beaver Creek and Arco are seeking access through 
discovery to transcripts of depositions taken in the federal 
action by Trail Mountain,of NPC's officers and employees. NPC 
claims that the deposition transcripts are the work product of 
its counsel and are therefore only discoverable as provided in 
13 
Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P. As the party claiming the 
privilege, NPC bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
transcripts are work product. NPC has failed to meet that 
burden. 
The transcripts of the depositions of NPCfs officers 
and employees taken by Trail Mountain are not the work product 
of counsel for NPC, and are therefore discoverable without 
first satisfying the requirements of Rule 26(b)(3). The work 
product privilege, on which Rule 26(b)(3) is based, is intended 
to create a zone of privacy in which an attorney can prepare a 
client's case free from the intrusions of opposing counsel. A 
The text of Rule 26(b)(3) is set forth in 
Appendix 9. 
_io_ 
deposition transcript is a verbatim record of the testimony 
given by a witness in response to questions posed by counsel. 
A deposition is not part of an attorney's private preparation 
of a client's case. Clearly, in this matter, the transcripts 
of depositions of NPC officers and employees conducted by Trail 
Mountain, which has copies of the transcripts, cannot be 
considered the private preparation of the case by counsel for 
NPC. Accordingly, the deposition transcripts are not protected 
by the work product privilege. 
In addition, Rule 32(a), U.R.C.P., explicitly 
authorizes the use of depositions taken in one lawsuit in a 
subsequent related lawsuit. This lawsuit involves the same 
parties, or their subsidiaries, as were parties to the federal 
action. In addition, this lawsuit is concerned with the same 
issue of whether Trail Mountain's coal was satisfactory for use 
in NPC's Reid Gardner Station, as was in dispute in the federal 
action. Under Rule 32(a), Arco and Beaver Creek may use the 
depositions taken in the federal action as evidence in this 
proceeding. The district court's ruling, however, renders Rule 
32(a) meaningless by denying Arco and Beaver Creek access to 
the depositions. 
The interests of economic judicial administration also 
dictate that NPC divulge the testimony of its witnesses 
concerning the matters in dispute in this lawsuit. Numerous 
NPC witnesses already have testified about their factual 
knowledge of the issues in dispute in this lawsuit. The time 
and expense of redeposing those witnesses can be avoided by 
granting Arco and Beaver Creek access to those depositions. 
Finally, discovery is intended to allow the parties to 
develop facts as completely as possible prior to trial, thereby 
narrowing the matters in dispute and encouraging settlement. 
Permitting NPC to secrete relevant, objective facts concerning 
matters at issue in this lawsuit would be contrary to the 
purpose of discovery. 
In summary, NPC has not carried its burden of 
demonstrating that the deposition transcripts of which Arco and 
Beaver Creek seek production are protected by the work product 
privilege. The district court's order must be reversed and an 
order entered compelling NPC to produce the requested 
deposition transcripts to Arco and Beaver Creek. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pending action among Trail Mountain, Arco, Beaver 
Creek and NPC, out of which this interlocutory appeal arises, 
is founded upon the same facts that gave rise to the federal 
action. In order to expedite discovery and to obtain access to 
the facts possessed by Trail Mountain and NPC, Arco and Beaver 
Creek requested copies of the deposition transcripts taken in 
the federal action from Trail Mountain and NPC. The deposition 
transcripts that Arco and Beaver Creek seek obviously contain 
relevant information concerning the use of Trail Mountain coal 
at NPCfs Reid Gardner Station. The deposition transcripts also 
may contain dispositive testimony concerning whether or not 
Trail Mountain coal was satisfactory for use at the Reid 
Gardner Station and NPC's apparent change of position 
concerning that subject, NPC's objection to producing the 
transcripts of depositions taken by counsel for Trail Mountain 
on the grounds that they are the work product of NPCfs counsel 
is without merit and must be rejected. 
II. DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT WORK 
PRODUCT SUBJECT TO RULE 26(b)(3) 
The work product privilege was first adopted by the 
United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 
495, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947) and was later incorporated into Rule 
26(b)(3) of the rules of civil procedure. Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 398, 101 S. Ct. 677, 687 (1981).14 
The work product privilege is an exception to the broad scope 
of discovery permitted under the discovery provisions of the 
rules of civil procedure. The Hickman Court recognized the 
work product privilege in order to create a "zone of privacy" 
Upjohn addresses Rule 26(b)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P., 
which is identical to Rule 26(b)(3), U.R.C.P. 
i n t e r f e r e n c e tr;>n: adve r sa r i e s 1 x . ^ p t i v f • *• 
i * * ' * • - ' ** * ;?ruceaure was 
u t t c e s s a i ; :.» Hickmaw ^w^,; .-,.-., , ^u . . . . p r o t e ^ t *"h» 
a d v e r s a r y p r o c e s s on wlu< * * -merj . -.* sys tem * jas* e i s 
base J ' ' « .liarnr t e r i v t 
from matters subject to m •>-. jveiv ;- i tin. 
part of an attorney's pri**1**- ^r^^i^ *• »M- A ! ,I , lipnt'^ r.ip.-, 
Depos 11 i uift I ranst. i i pi i» < i 
part of the formal, open discovery process estabiishec n^ f e 
rules oi civil procedure, u u oi an attorne private 
preparation ot a i Lieut "s rn ie 
1 The Discovery Procedures Established By The Rul 
Of Civil Procedure Are Designed To Encourage Fu 
Disclosure And Must Be Construed Broadly 
The pre trial discovery procedure e M ui ...»;,:. : J1 
26 to 37 of the r uJ es of civ:; i procedure dramatically 
^t.j before tria] was naii<wly confined Hickman, "'2^ J 
iieen described as "a battle oi wits rather tl lai i a sear d. -^r 
the truth, ' ' 8 C i /right & * Mil.ti -Vderai Practice and 
I i c ( iiediii i § 2 0 0 ] • < • (Ill 5 
In contrast, the discovery 5 n e s \i\<v -..jve i-«en adopted r 
and the federal courts create an integrated mechanism for 
narrowing and clarifying the issues in dispute between the 
parties and for ascertaining the facts, or information that may 
lead to the discovery of the facts, concerning the issues in 
dispute. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 388-89; 
Wright & Miller § 2001 at 13, 16. With the adoption of the 
discovery rules "civil trials . . . no longer need be carried 
on in the dark." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 389; 
accord, United States v.,Procter & Gamble Co,, 356 UCS. 677, 
682-83, 78 S. Ct. 983; 986-87 (1958). The present discovery 
rules are based on the philosophy that every party to a civil 
action is entitled to the discovery of all information that is 
relevant or that may lead to the discovery of relevant 
information, unless the information is privileged. Hickman, 
329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 389; Wright & Miller § 2001 at 15. 
The discovery rules are construed liberally and the 
exceptions to discovery are narrowly confined. Hickman, 329 
U.S. at 506-07, 67 S. Ct. at 391-92; Transamerica Title 
Insurance Co. v. United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 
P.2d 165, 167 (1970); Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 
P.2d 39, 40 (1967); Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P.; Wright & Miller § 
2001 at 17. Consequently, the party asserting a privilege, in 
this case NPC, bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
material sought to be protected is within the scope of the 
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privi 1 ege asserted Casson Construction Co . v. Armco Steel, 
Corp., 91 F R.D. 376 385 (D KJ n i I 1980); Feldman v. Pioneer 
Pet roleum
 2 Inc 8:i F E I) 86 , 88 (I i I : 1 3 i II 980 ) 
. • The transcripts of the deposd tioi is sought by & rco a nd 
Beaver Creek were taken :i i: I a related federal acti on, which 
:i i ivo] ved 1:1: le qi lesti oi :t of wl letl lei 1:1: \e ' T'I: a i ] Mc i n it ad i: i. coa] i /a s 
suitable for use at the Reid Gardner Statioi i Tl: lat also :i s a 
pivotJ-1 :i ssue in thi s ca se Ob'v i ousl y „ the transcripts of the 
d e p o s , r: i o i i, s c o n t a :i i: I i: e 1 e y a i 11 d i I f o i: rn a t :I o i i P e r in, d 1: t :ii n g N I " C 1: D 
deny Arco and Beaver Creek access to those deposition 
t r ans c r i p t s , wh i c h b o t h NP C and T r a d 1 Mo u nt a i n hav e , i s wh o .1 ] y 
inconsistent witL . .u- ±tt. >*<~,pii\ .ii nurpose c. 
; w i procedure under which he depositions were takei 
-,ixo An-*, tfeaver Creek will be. denied infor.nd. i^ -.
 it_, 
relevant or which -us •- \t*.\A i ihe dis^ overv 1 admi ssi ^ lt-
i • i ' 1 I I I I I M I I ' I Il i n II II ( i f f ) ! I I I 1 1 1 n m w l I l u l l I I n I ml l l i i l 11 i l l I i t 1 ' I I 111 II » l i I I i HI I 
p o s s e s s . 
The distinguishing Characteristic Of Work Pro met 
Is That It Is Created As Part of An Attcrnev's 
P r i v a * " ^ ^ »*l«-*^ ^ *" it" i n p n f ;. C 1 i £»rs ! * <-' "* i •-: f-i 
In. Hickman i * «)uf-h s > u i s c o v u u , sur1^*- *-~ 
f i l e r u l e s o f n v n o c e d n r e n o t e s t \\pv. hv AW - n - n o s i ' i g 
11 i in I ,i " i in I I  in in in 1 •)' 
interviews with potential witnesses. n9..'. IJ. r. . a: -*yo 1Q. c.l 
S. Ct. at 387-88. The issue addressed by the Hickman Court 
was whether those documents were protected from discovery. 
Id. at 505, 67 S. Ct. at 391. The Hickman Court concluded 
that the documents were not subject to discovery because the 
request was an effort to obtain access to the files and mental 
impressions of an attorney. Id. at 510, 67 S. Ct. at 393. As 
such, the request "contravene[d] the public policy underlying 
the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims." Id., 67 
S* Ct. at 393. 
The rationale on which the Hickman Court's decision 
is founded focuses on the conflict which the Court perceived 
between the liberal scope of inquiry mandated by the discovery 
rules and the need for privacy essential to an attorney's 
preparation of a client's case. Id. at 510-11, 67 S. Ct. at 
393-94. The need for privacy arises due to the role of an 
attorney in the adversary process on which the American system 
of litigation is premised. 
Proper preparation of a client's case demands 
that [an attorney] assemble information, sift 
what he considers to be the relevant from the 
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and 
plan his strategy without undue and needless 
interference. That is the historical and the 
necessary way in which lawyers act within the 
framework of our system of jurisprudence to 
promote justice and to protect their clients' 
interests. 
Id. at 511; 67 S. Ct. at 393. 
-i A 
• . The Hickman Coui I: believed t:l: la t ' f01 ei rig an attorney 
to repeat: ox to write out a] 1 that witnesses have told him and 
to deliver the account to 1 in s adversary gives rise *-*-) 
dangers of inaccuracy and jntrustwoi t:l 11 i less ' ' ', 
67 S. Ctc, at 394 Permitting an adversary to inquire into an 
a 11 o r n e y ' s p r e p a r a t i o i: i D f a ::: ] i e i I t: ' s ::: a s e \ t a s i i n a c c e p t a b ] e 
becaus e i t wou 1 d t rans f o rm the a11 o rney f i: oni '"" an o f f i c er o £ the 
court" into an "ordinary witness." Id. at 513, 67 S, Ct at 
394.
 t . .: • :' • 
To preserve the pi ibl I c policy on whi ch our system, of 
iitigation is based, the Hickman (lourl recognized a "zone of 
privacy I twit r. J privilege, thai pmli.'i t ii ait atioriiry » 
"*rrk product " I'd .H M l (W S, CI il W \ Hie 
I)'**** •'«- i, haracterxst±c • ** - roduct, however
 s is that 
*t JS produced m the cour^^ n ..:, ,. v,.;. ^  preparation for 
litigation Deposit tons o. .-j*:;i^ :- hat parameter. 
3. Deposition lraaSv.rirL;i ..  r-: ;IU- Product if T1 e 
Discovery Mechanism Created By The Rules of Civil 
Procedure And Are Not Part Of The Private 
Preparation Of A Client's Case 
A deposit J«' • i •-• ••..• •'.;<. : .'irc^  pi ,nciph t .  i . f 
discovery created tut rii>*:~- * v .•r.'K edure, Rule }^ , 
1 ;
 '- : \.t'd . u takxiig 
o e p w S P i'Mi, requires that iut n.r o- \.^ - a^/us > t i on te given: 
!
~h^t i« ^vt-fi^ ^ permitted : ^ present during the 
truthfulness; that the proceedings be recorded verbatim by a 
court reporter (an independent officer of the court); that the 
court reporter certify under oath that the transcript of the 
testimony is complete and accurate; that the deponent certify 
under oath that the testimony is complete and accurate; and 
that the transcript of the testimony be filed with the court. 
These procedures establish an open forum in which admissible 
facts and information that may lead to the discovery of 
admissible facts can be uncovered by attorneys acting as 
advocates for their clients. 
The procedures established by the rules of civil 
procedure are incompatible with the concept of a "zone of 
privacy" which the Hickman Court recognized. Any private 
preparation or mental impressions of the client's case 
contained in a deposition transcript necessarily have been 
disclosed to adversaries during the course of the deposition. 
Once a matter is disclosed to an adversary, it cannot be 
protected from discovery by the work product privilege. In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980); 
Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749, 751-52 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983). The work product privilege does not apply to 
depositions because the very nature of depositions mandates a 
waiver of the privilege. 
In this case, any mental impressions of or private 
preparation by counsel for NPC that may have been disclosed in 
the course n. . - . . : . 
already l -en disclosed • . ; . * Mountain, NPC's idversary . and 
i i i n i i i i i i i i i l . ••! • NPC c l o a k t h e 
transcript - .. : , • , ii LC^I^ dj*u , M}. loyees >i* io n c w?+-h 
Hie work product privilege simplv by ilaeing these depositions 
i II I lit1 fi'i r > . f - . ,q^K^wi. _v ._ v- c^ i-e_^  ^_t w_ 
Copper Co> , 2/ Uron <:o -}w M9L? F :-i 1.254, : 2 3 7 ( 1 Q 7 2 . 
Thn »--r'-'. • :»-'*•. established '- ' ••<- • ib- ••< civil 
procedure - • • * • :- i a - . 
inaccuracy that concerned the Hickman Cour* -ie. presence ;t 
,-.*. independent court r*-i' -fc ' ensures that * *ie re'-.-rd w.'l oe 
complete and accurate - .ditiuiK i lit . c,^ c : f .*e . w. >rney 
^ an officer of the- , o\;rt <nid •. idv^cate lor ^ client is iot 
1 ^ ; t * O I" '" ir 
responsible ! ... J t~v oi .J i.u>- . *.*- ^aeoiiuno auu answers. >, the 
• o-ictrn expressed hv vAu- Hickman Court are not raised i: -'ie 
* i . 
final3v ibe uork product privilege has no application 
documept s thai <* J *•• n. '!'.<• possessor t third persons. 
Mountain i ae couit repuiiei and i be LUULI ...iVc? possesbLui 
the deposition transcripts precludes the application wi che 
wo ft 
in : -.MIL neither the underlying purpose of the work 
product pnv±le£- nor the salutary effect ^L Liie privilege are 
furthered by the application of the work product privilege to 
deposition transcripts. To the contrary because depositions 
are one of the tools of discovery created by the rules of civil 
procedure there is no basis for and no need to preclude 
discovery of deposition transcripts. 
III. DENYING ARCO AND BEAVER CREEK ACCESS TO THE 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS IS CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE 
OF DISCOVERY 
The basic philosophy on which the discovery rules are 
based is that all persons should have access to all relevant 
information prior to trial. Wright & Miller § 2001 at 15. 
Discovery of such information helps narrow the factual and 
legal issues in dispute, thereby encouraging settlements and 
the most efficient use of scarce judicial resources. Hickman, 
329 U.S. at 501, 67 S. Ct. at 388-89; Ellis, 429 P.2d at 40; 
Wright & Miller § 2001 at 17-18. 
In this instance, both Trail Mountain and NPC have 
access to the depositions that Arco and Beaver Creek have 
requested. The federal action in which those depositions were 
taken and this action have a common pivotal issue: whether or 
not the Trail Mountain coal was satisfactory for use in NPCfs 
Reid Gardner Station. Thus, denying Arco and Beaver Creek 
access to these depositions denies Arco and Beaver Creek access 
to relevant facts that the other parties possess. In contrast, 
granting Arco and Beaver Creek access to the deposition 
transcripts and the facts they contain will narrow and clarify 
scope ct J, m a t t e r s t h a t t\e^6 • , * t r i e d . io improving the 
p o S S l b i 1 * * * * v.. t-1 ] pjiiPf: '• i r - *-^ " * ' ^ t K »* T-/ 
Beaver *_p- •_ 
[rail Mi 'Mtain J ' resent I v mosses.- . - lothmg nn-rt: t' -m 
* - * *i hai^t : 1 . * u lor m e LXULII 
iij. K o 5-iMic . * . ^ * ww >i v : * ,at .. n practices 
3uch Jb _^ j proposed * . - « ; nu io;.t-.: 
IV. ARCO AND BfcAVER CREEK ARE ENTITLED TO USE THE 
DEPOSITIONS FROM THE FEDERAL ACTION IN THIS CASE 
T 
d e p o s i t i o n t r a n s c r i p t s may he a d m i s s i b l e a t i n a i . Indeed 
Rule 3 ? ^ • ~f '' l ! ^ p r e ^ h * M** ^ mp I at e- t h - ^ *n • -•••-.' : oris 
. ase ma> tie used at trial o! ..bsequent action See 
--.' £, , iri^u; VI')L_1 i »isu lat i_L4jii ']orj. '• ru_ j i ^li*_-it j_-m, Iru 
• V r ^ !'^ !'° ' w* * " 1°'<^ accord, DeLuryea v. 
Winthrop Laboratories, 69? F 2d 2J2S 22b 2/ :8th , ,r :(>?n* 
(transcript from worker ¥ s compensation proceeding admi ssible in 
later products liability case); Rule v. International 
Association of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 
"Local Union :± _ _ - 00-0? « 1 ) 
(depositions taker; i,t go\ < r, .men', . ,-^ln^mopt J I S L I iminJL ton case 
admissible m latr t actiii rouph: 1^ 1 . . nembers) ; Minjren 
:10th 
-?4-
Cir. 1971) (Insul-Wood characterized as "bedrock" authority); 
Tug Raven v. Trexler, 419 F.2d 536, 542-43 (4th Cir. 1969), 
cert, denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970) (transcript from coast 
guard proceedings admissible in later personal injury action); 
Batelli v Kagen & Gaines Co., 236 F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir. 
1956) (transcript of deposition taken during action on 
superseded contract admissible in subsequent proceeding on 
superseding contract); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. 
Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (deposition transcript 
from one asbestos action admissible in another asbestos 
action); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 515 
F. Supp. 834, 847 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (deposition transcript from 
one patent action admissible in subsequent patent action); In 
re Panoceanic Tankers Corp., 54 F.R.D. 283, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971) (coast guard hearing transcript admissible in later civil 
proceeding); Fullerform Continuous Pipe Corp. v. American Pipe 
& Construction Co., 44 F.R.D. 453, 455-56 (D. Ariz. 1968) 
(deposition transcript from earlier antitrust action admissible 
in subsequent antitrust action involving a new plaintiff); In 
re Estate of Eliasen, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110, 116 (1983) 
(deposition transcript from divorce proceeding admissible in 
estate proceeding). Access to the testimony contained in the 
deposition transcripts clearly is essential if the transcripts 
are to be useful in preparing the client's case or to be 
offered as evidence at trial. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 515, 67 S. 
Ct a 1: 396 ( J a cl c s :)i i J c :: i 1 :::i ii i: :i i ig) 11: le j: ::is:i t:i oi l ta kei l by 
NPC and adopted by the d istrict court is erroneous because i t 
contravenes the provisions of Rule 32 (a) by deny i rig Arco and 
Beaver Creek access to the deposition transcripts. 
V THE DONUT SHOPS CASE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER 
The district courtf s ri ili ng i s based f"he i easoning 
expressed :i i i D P I m t SI lops Mai lagemei it Corp , v i iQ.. <. 
Serv. 2d 1 95 (Callaghan) (E.D. Va 1977) l 1 i: * n Motioi, for 
Product! on of Doci iments (E Moti on to Cor x * ' "' ' --L 
Shops , 1: I- i c • s e p a r a t: e p a i: I: i e s , I) o i I i 11 S1: i : j: s <^ • * r 
("Donut Shops" ) and Chick'n G f 1 ore , 1: lad :inii . at ed separate 
act i oiis be f ore the United S t; 11 e s Pa t ei 11 ind ra.: ?n;,: rk Office 
seeking cancellati on of federal tradema:. it,,ib. ; a: ions owned 
hy John II, M»*<e. .3 Fed, K , Scii'v. *M .i tin 'h=s 
i u n i s (•* 11II 11 r e f M r i u p f i 1 i i i II 11 II 111 inn1 
deposed certain persons who were thought .-.* knowledge ii. 
t he ci r cums t ance s s urrounding Mace's t rademark registrations. 
reived Chick ime \*
 A .. nuti^r ...t*^ -d ,ui a n g e m e n t of 
W M W I ' *ehts M !>< .1/ :^ hi-: < it t unt -s * :iei: served a 
I. C I * <U» O I I I "' 
subpoena included <\ lequebt nut • i-f a i u i n e ^ hi m & t.* :i^ 
deposition copies ' , • . -.• * i? i •. ,, d e p o s i t i o n s *:hat h e 
1: l a d 1 ril< e n II in II IIin-
O tL 
against Mace. Id. Chick1n Gflore's motion to quash the 
subpoena was granted. Id. at 196. 
The Donut Shops case is distinguishable from this 
case in two critical respects. First, the question presented 
by Arco and Beaver Creek's motion to compel is whether NPC, a 
party, can be compelled to produce the transcripts of 
depositions of its officers and employees taken by another 
party in another action. In contrast, the Donut Shops' 
attorneys were seeking tp obtain the deposition transcripts by 
deposing the attorney for an adverse party. Donut Shops 
wanted more than deposition transcripts, it also wanted to 
question the attorney who took the depositions. Id. Quite 
simply, Donut Shops sought to invade the zone of privacy that 
the work product doctrine is intended to protect. Arco and 
Beaver Creek's request poses no such threat. All Arco and 
Beaver Creek seek is the deposition transcripts prepared by the 
court reporter. There is no possibility that the production of 
those transcripts will invade the zone of privacy because the 
transcripts are merely verbatim recordings of what was said in 
an open adversary proceeding. 
The district court's reliance on Donut Shops also is 
inappropriate because the Donut Shops court expressly stated 
that whether the depositions sought in that case "are 
obtainable from the parties [to the related proceeding] or the 
court reporter that took them is not before this Court for 
d e t e r m i ii<11, mi i 11 ""' L d . (Enipl: 1as:i s added) II: le Donut Shops 
d e c i s i o n he Id on 1 y t:hat I)onut Shops coin 1 d i i.ot ob t ai n the 
d e p o s i t i o n transcrn plus from Chick1 n G' ' l o r e ' s a t t o r n e y , 1 J . ax 
1,96 97 Thus, the Donut Shops court e x p r e s s ] y d e c l i n e d ^o 
r u l e or -* -*„ : - sue r a i s e d by Arco and Beaver C r e e k ' s motion 
t :> COIIIJI ' . 
*
 Jifferenco "•"- context and a n method, of discovery 
between * ;•* Donut Shops rase and this a*w- establish the error 
c £ the * * - . 
Shops c. . s denied Donut Shops access • .) T n* deposition 
transcripts JLL r - **-:* '** >\ ise Donut bu v - sn-ght * » obtain them 
Ivy deposing an adversar y ' s attornev. . , .. ,;e 
necessarily invades the zone of piiv-a -, 'ha: th* w-,rk product 
doctri n e :i s i n t e n d e d tc • protect :• r i f i c at :i on for 
extending the Donut Shops rule to , <. - rhis whe^e 
the zone nt p n v n - v is- . threatened 
Arco and Beaver Creek have moved thi s Court for an 
order reversing the district court'" s order and ordering NPC to 
I;,) v ( J d u 'i ti il i" i i in . i in 111 I \ e a <i ? e i: C i e e k 11: a i I s c i: :i p • 1: s ! :) f 1:1 I = d e p o £3 i t i o n s 
of NPC T s officers ai id directors taken i i :i„ the federal act ion. 
h*-- error »f the
 (jh strict cour* u- -n- *; »>: ise . t 
,• - « r 
\M je t ! rule ?6(b)( ' t Denying AX I- * <d heaver Cre-K i ess 
L U Liie deposition transcripts vioxdito the p^rp^o^ ^ 
discovery. Rule 32(a) requires that Arco and Beaver Creek have 
access to the deposition transcripts requested so that they may 
be used in this action. The case relied upon by the district 
court does not support the district court's order. For these 
reasons, Arco and Beaver Creek request that this Court reverse 
the district court's order and direct the entry of an order 
compelling NPC to produce the deposition transcripts to Arco 
and Beaver Creek. 
DATED this 18th day of May, 1987. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
John A. Snow 
David L. Deisley 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Thomas F. Linn 
P. 0. Box 5300 
Denver, Colorado 80217 
Telephone: (303) 293-4234 
Attorneys tot Ap^eTlants 
Arc© Coal Sales'^  Company and 
Beaver Creek Coal Company 
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APPENDIX 1 
COMPLAINT (JURY DEMANDED) 
William B. Bohling 
Kent T. Anderson 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company, through its 
counsel of record, hereby complains of the defendant, Nevada 
Power Company, as follows: 
I, DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
!• Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Trail Mountain"), is and was at 
all times material hereto, a California corporation with its 
principal place of business in Emery County, State of Utah. 
COMPLAINT 
(JURY DEMANDED) 
iivil No. t^(-(fjclrl 
Trail Mountain owns and operates the Trail Mountain Coal Mine 
located in Emery County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Nevada Power Company (hereinafter 
referred to as "NPC"), is and was at all times material hereto 
a Nevada corporation, with its principal place of business in 
the state of Nevada. 
3. NPC is and was at all times material hereto 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and was doing 
business on a regular basis within the State of Utah, and this 
Court has general in personam jurisdiction over NPC for all 
purposes. 
4. The contract on which Trail Mountain's claims are 
founded is to be performed by Plaintiff and Defendant in the 
State of Utah. 
5. The contract on which Trail Mountain's claims are 
founded provides that Plaintiff was to supply and Defendant was 
to receive coal in the State of Utah pursuant to such contract. 
6. The contract on which Trail Mountain's claims are 
founded provides that it is to be construed and performed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah applicable to 
agreements made and to be performed in the State of Utah. 
7. NPC has neglected, refused and otherwise failed 
to perform in accordance with the provisions of such contract, 
-2-
causing injury to Trail Mountain and others in the State of 
Utah. 
8. This Court has jurisdiction over all claims set 
forth herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by virtue of the fact 
that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states 
and the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, 
exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars (fclO,000.00). Venue is properly 
before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 
II. FACTS 
9. On or about March 1, 1980, NPC and Trail Mountain 
entered into a coal sales agreement, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference (the "Trail Mountain/NPC Contract"). 
10. Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC 
agreed to purchase from Trail Mountain specified tonnages of 
coal per year for the indefinite term of the contract. For 
calendar years 1983 and thereafter, NPC was required to 
purchase 300,000 tons of coal from Trail Mountain, but which 
quantity could be reduced to 200,000 tons per year at NPC's 
election. The contract could not be terminated prior to 
December 31, 1994, and then only upon two years prior written 
notice. 
11. The contract listed, among other specifications 
for the coal, a three percent maximum sodium oxide content in 
the ash. 
12. Swisher Coal Company, a Utah corporation, and a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield Company, a 
Pennsylvania corporation (hereinafter referred to as MARCO") 
and NPC entered into a coal supply agreement dated as of March 
1, 1980, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference 
(hereinafter referred to as the "ARCO/NPC Contract"). 
13. Pursuant to the ARCO/NPC Contract, NPC agreed to 
purchase between 225,000 and 275,000 tons of coal per year from 
ARCO, which coal was a blend of coal including coal to be 
purchased by ARCO from Trail Mountain. 
14. As an integral part of the ARCO/NPC Contract, 
Trail Mountain and ARCO entered into a coal supply agreement 
dated as of January 3, 1980, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by 
this reference (hereinafter referred to as the "Trail 
Mountain/ARCO Contract"). 
15. Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, 
ARCO agreed to purchase 120,000 tons of coal per year from 
Trail Mountain from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1994. 
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16. Since the inception of the Trail Mountain/NPC and 
Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts in early 1980, Trail Mountain has 
consistently shipped the tonnage of coal required pursuant to 
each contract, while the sodium oxide content of the ash in the 
Trail Mountain reserves has consistently exceeded three 
percent. At no time prior to late 1983, did NPC complain or 
otherwise object to the sodium oxide content of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal. ARCO itself has never objected to the sodium 
content of Trail Mountain Mine coal, and ARCO did not 
communicate any objection from NPC until May 1984. All such 
monthly shipments prior to such dates were accepted and paid 
for as full compliance with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and 
the Trial Mountain/ARCO Contract. 
17. As late as January 1984, officials from NPC told 
Trail Mountain personnel that the quality of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal was very good and that they were very pleased with 
Trail Mountain Mine coal. 
18. Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC 
requested that the annual shipments of coal for calendar year 
1983 be reduced from 300,000 to 200,000 tons. Trail Mountain 
complied with this request. 
19. On August 13, 1983, NPC requested that Trail 
Mountain voluntarily reduce coal shipments by an additional 15% 
below the 200,000 ton minimum contained in the contract. NPC 
apparently sought this reduction because abundant river flows 
had generated excess hydro-electric power, which power, on 
information and belief, is less expensive than coal-generated 
power. 
20. Trail Mountain informed NPC that a reduction of 
the Trail Mountain Mine's production by an additional 15% would 
mean lowering production to an uneconomical operational level, 
and expressed to NPC a willingness to reduce its production by 
15% if NPC would make certain concessions to Trail Mountain. 
NPC refused to make such concessions, but continued to insist 
that Trail Mountain reduce its coal shipments by 15% below the 
minimum specified in the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract. No 
agreement to alter the contract was reached by Trail Mountain 
and NPC. 
21. In late 1983, for the first time, NPC informed 
Trail Mountain that the coal from the Trail Mountain Mine 
allegedly did not comply with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract 
specifications because of a high sodium oxide content, and on 
March 20, 1984, NPC informed Trail Mountain that further 
shipments of Trail Mountain Mine coal must be suspended unless 
all specifications, including sodium oxide content were met. 
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22. In May 1984, ARCO informed Trail Moutain that NPC 
had notified ARCO that the coal from the Trail Mountain Mine 
was unsatisfactory to NPC. ARCO suspended shipments under the 
Trail Mountain/ARCO agreement because of NPC's complaints, and 
ARCO refused to accept further delivery of Trail Mountain Mine 
coal. 
23. Negotiations between Trail Mountain and NPC took 
place during the spring and summer of 1984. Solely as an 
accommodation to NPC, and not as an admission of any obligation 
pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, Trail Mountain 
succeeded in locating a coal supplier whose coal could be mixed 
with Trail Mountain's coal and achieve a mix with a maximum 
sodium oxide content of less than three percent. Consequently, 
Trail Mountain offered to supply a 50/50 mix of Trail Mountain 
coal and substitute coal to NPC pursuant to the provisions of 
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and thus provide coal in 
strict conformity with the language of the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract as originally drafted. 
24. NPC's response to this substitute coal offer was 
to permit such substitution and blending of the coal, but not 
without imposing additional unreasonable conditions upon Trail 
Mountain that are not contained in the Contract, including but 
not limited to, requiring "perfect blending", a guaranty that 
the blended coal would not adversely affect operations of the 
Reid Gardner units, an agreement that Trail Mountain pay $1000 
per day for damages to the Reid Gardner units, and a reduction 
in the price for the coal.. 
25. Subsequently, NPC withdrew the additional 
unreasonable conditions to the coal substitution proposal, but 
stated that NPC did not accept the substitution proposal and 
terminated the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract effective August 1, 
1984. 
26. As a direct and proximate result of NPC's breach 
and wrongful acts, Trail Mountain will suffer money damages as 
follows: 
a. Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract in an amount of no less than Ten Million One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars (tlO,100,000.00); 
b. Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract in an amount of no less than Seven Million 
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($7,250,000.00); 
c. The wrongful termination of the Trail 
Mountain/NPC and Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts will 
necessitate the closing of the Trail Mountain Mine, 
which will result in a loss of sales of Trail Mountain 
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coal to third parties causing damages of not less than 
Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00); 
d. Damages directly resulting from closing 
costs of the mine, idle costs, personnel severance and 
other costs, lease obligations and related expenses in 
an amount of not less than Nine Million Dollars 
($9,000,000.00); 
e. Other incidental and consequential damages 
in an amount of not less than Ten Million Dollars 
(£10,000,000.00). 
27. If NPC is not immediately required to accept 
delivery of and pay for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the 
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and accept deliveries of coal under 
the ARCO/NPC Contract including Trail Mountain coal, the 
following irreparable injuries will be incurred by Trail 
Mountain, third parties, and the public: 
a. Trail Mountain will be required to close the 
mine. While Trail Mountain would comply with all laws 
relating to mine safety procedures, closure of the 
mine will probably result in the fresh air equipment 
being shut off or removed, temperature changes within 
the mine, carbon dioxide collection in the mine unless 
fan equipment is continuously operated, and as a 
result the mine infrastructure will likely 
deteriorate, thus increasing the risk of the mine 
becoming a health hazard to the public in and around 
the mine area, and increasing the health hazards and 
risks associated with any reopening and work to be 
done within the mine; 
b. Closing of the mine will likely result in a 
decrease or discontinuance of the maintenance of the 
mine's infrastructure and all equipment left within 
the mine. Increased moisture will collect in the 
mine, and the possibility of infrastructure and 
equipment failure will increase, increasing the risk 
of safety hazards to persons and the public in and 
around the mine area, and increasing the dangers and 
risks upon any reopening or work to be performed 
within the mine; 
c. Closing of the mine will result in the loss 
of the mine's experienced work force, which has a low 
injury rate, and valuable training and experience in 
the Trail Mountain mine. This work force is difficult 
to replace and cannot be compensated with money 
damages, and any reopening of the mine with a new work 
force that is less highly trained and less familiar 
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with this particular mine will increase the risks and 
danger to such work force and others and the public in 
and around the mine upon any reopening or work to be 
done within the mine. The mine workers, who will be 
laid off during a time of a depressed coal market, 
will suffer direct and irreparable injury. 
III. CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT I 
28. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
29. The Trail Mountain/NPC Contract is an 
"installment contract" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-612. 
30. The monthly coal shipments from Trail Mountain to 
NPC substantially conform to all material provisions of the 
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and the sodium oxide content of 
Trail Mountain coal does not substantially impair the value of 
any one or all installments of coal shipped to NPC. 
31. By NPC's refusal to accept delivery of Trail 
Mountain Mine coal, NPC has breached the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract and is liable to Trail Mountain for such breach of 
contract in an amount to be determined at the trial of this 
action. 
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COUNT II 
32. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1 through 31 above. 
33. NPC consistently accepted delivery of Trail 
Mountain coal during the first four years of the contract, and 
Trail Mountain continued to rely upon such acceptance by NPC 
and performed in accordance with the contract. 
34. NPC sought to breach the contract by requiring 
Trail Mountain to reduce coal shipments by fifteen percent 
below the minimum amount specified in the Contract, apparently 
in response to and as a result of NPC's ability to buy 
hydro-electric power at cheaper rates. 
35. When Trail Mountain refused to allow NPC to 
breach the Contract by reducing coal shipments, NPC utilized 
the alleged failure to meet the sodium oxide content criteria 
in the Contract as a subterfuge for the improper purpose of 
eliminating all shipments of coal under the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract. 
36. By virtue of the acts complained of herein, NPC 
breached the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and breached its 
obligations of fair dealing, reasonableness and good faith 
contained explicitly and implicitly in the Contract and as 
prescribed by statute, for which breach Trail Mountain is 
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entitled to damages from NPC in an amount to be determined at 
the trial of this action. 
COUNT III 
37. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 above. 
38. During the four year course of performance and 
course of dealing pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, 
Trail Mountain's shipments of coal from the Trail Mountain Mine 
and acceptance and payment for such coal by NPC, established 
the terms of the Contract and the conformance of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal in accordance with the Contract. 
39. The course of performance and course of dealing 
between NPC and Trail Mountain with respect to the Contract 
modified such contract to eliminate a specific sodium oxide 
content requirement for Trail Mountain Mine coal and such 
contract provides that Trail Mountain coal is acceptable and in 
conformance with such modified contractual provisions. 
40. NPC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal 
is in breach of the NPC Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled 
to damages from NPC in an amount to be determined at the trial 
of this action. 
COUNT IV 
41. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations in paragraphs 1 through 40 above. 
42. During the four years of performance pursuant to 
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, whereby Trail Mountain 
supplied coal to NPC, NPC has waived any requirement that 
sodium oxide in the Trail Mountain Mine coal ash be less than 
three percent through its acquiesence and acceptance of Trail 
Mountain Mine coal as performance pursuant to the Contract. 
43. Trail Mountain relied on the waiver of the sodium 
oxide content specifications to the detriment of Trail Mountain 
by, among other things, Trail Mountain's failure to seek or 
accept alternative contracts or purchasers for Trail Mountain 
Mine coal during the course of the four years of performance 
pursuant to the NPC Contract? and Trail Mountain's reopening, 
maintaining and operating of the mine. 
44. NPC has waived any requirement that sodium oxide 
content in Trail Mountain Mine coal not exceed three percent, 
and NPC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal with a 
sodium oxide content in excess of three percent is a breach of 
the Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an 
amount to be determined at trial. 
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COUNT V 
45. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 44 above. 
46. ARCO has refused to accept shipments of Trail 
Mountain coal because NPC informed ARCO that Trail Mountain 
Mine coal is unacceptable for use in NPC's Reid Gardner station. 
47. The coal from the Trail Mountain Mine is in 
conformance with the ARCO/NPC Contract and the Trail 
Mountain/ARCO Contract, and NPC's refusal to accept Trail 
Mountain Mine coal through its blending with ARCO coal is a 
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract of which Trail Mountain is an 
intended third-party beneficiary. 
48. The terms of the ARCO/NPC Contract that coal 
supplied to NPC must be satisfactory for use at the Reid 
Gardner station has been contemporaneously interpreted during 
the term of that contract and Trail Mountain mine coal has 
consistently been and remains satisfactory for use by NPC, and 
NPC has waived any requirement, if any, that such coal contain 
a sodium oxide content not exceeding three percent. 
49. NPC's refusal to accept coal from the Trail 
Mountain Mine to be blended with ARCO coal pursuant to the 
ARCO/NPC Contract is a breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract, and 
_1 C_ 
Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
COUNT VI 
50. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 above. 
51. The Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract provides that 
ARCO will purchase from Trail Mountain a minimum of 120,000 
tons of coal per year, and that such coal should be 
satisfactory for use in NPC's Reid Gardner plant. 
52. Trail Mountain Mine coal is satisfactory for use 
at NPC's Reid Gardner plant. 
53. NPC has, during the first four years of the 
ARCO/NPC Contract, accepted Trail Mountain coal for use at 
NPC's Reid Gardner plant, and through this course of 
performance has established Trail Mountain coal as satisfactory 
for use at the Reid Gardner plant. 
54. NPC has wrongfully induced ARCO to refuse to 
accept delivery of Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail 
Mountain/ARCO Contract. 
55. NPC's interference with and inducement to breach 
the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract has caused direct, incidental 
and consequential damages to Trail Mountain, and Trail Mountain 
-16-
is entitled to money damages against NPC in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
COUNT VII 
56. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 above. 
57. Paragraph 2.2 of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract 
provides that Trail Mountain has the right to supply substitute 
coal to NPC, subject to NPC's approval, which approval will not 
be unreasonably withheld. 
58. Trail Mountain offered to NPC a substitute 
mixture of its coal and another supplier's coal with an 
aggregate sodium oxide content under three percent, not as an 
admission of any requirement in the contract that coal have a 
sodium oxide content of less than three percent, but solely as 
an accommodation to NPC and in an effort to deal in good faith 
to meet the demands of NPC. 
59. NPC refused to accept such substitute coal 
without conditions that were not set forth or contemplated in 
the NPC Contract, and which conditions were unreasonable, 
unworkable, burdensome and oppressive. 
60. NPC's refusal to accept substitute coal from 
Trail Mountain constitutes a breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount 
to be determined at trial. 
COUNT VIII 
61. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 60 above. 
62. NPC's breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract 
as set forth in Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII above, and NPC's 
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract in which Trail Mountain is a 
third-party beneficiary, and NPC's improper interference with 
the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, will result in immediate 
irreparable damages to Trail Mountain, third parties and the 
public, by increasing the risks and dangers of the Trail 
Mountain Mine by increasing the deterioration of the 
infra-structure and equipment in such mine, and increasing 
health and safety dangers on the occasion of the mine's 
reopening, and will cause irreparable injury due to the loss of 
an experienced and well-trained work force familiar with the 
mine, and will increase the risk to the mine workers upon a 
reopening of the mine with different personnel. The mine 
employees will also suffer immediate and direct irreparable 
injury. 
63. Trail Mountain is entitled to a preliminary and 
permanent injunction requiring NPC to commence immediately and 
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continue purchasing Trail Mountain coal in accordance with the 
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require NPC to inform 
immediately and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay for 
Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract and the ARCO/NPC Contract. 
WHEREFORE, Trail Mountain prays for judgment against 
NPC as follows: 
A. For a preliminary and permanent injunction 
requiring NPC to commence immediately and continue acceptance 
of and make payment for Trail Mountain coal in accordance with 
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require NPC to 
immediately inform and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay 
for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract and for NPC to accept delivery and pay for Trail 
Mountain coal as blended under the ARCO/NPC Contract. 
B. For a money judgment against NPC in an amount of 
not less than Forty-six Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($46,250,000.00). 
C. For interest on the amount of all damages at the 
legal rate from the date of NPC's suspension of acceptance of 
Trail Mountain coal through judgment and at the judgment rate 
from the date of judgment until paid. 
D. For all costs of this action. 
E. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems just and equitable. 
DATED this C> day of August, 1984. 
STATE OF KENTUCKY ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF fayeffa^ ) 
I, John Dragos, being first duly sworn, do hereby 
verify and certify that I am an authorized agent of Trail 
Mountain Coal Company, and I have read the foregoing Complaint 
and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge, information and belief. 
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ds S>C6 DATED thi  S>'6 day of August, 1984. 
JCpri Dragos ^-^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this O f /J day of 
August, 1984. 
OCui 
NOTARY PUBLIC ' 
Residing at: iu^ c^rhy^
 f ((J^HJIJLL^ 
My Commission Expires: 
/6'J-/~W 
Plaintiff's Address: 
1200 First Security Plaza 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507 
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CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON 
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77 West Second South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAU 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, 
Defendant. 
I ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
OF NEVADA POWER COMPANY 
i Civil No. C-84-0686A 
i Chief Judge Aldon J. Anderson 
COMES NOW Nevada Power Company and moves to dismiss the I 
Complaint for its failure to state a claim against this defendant I 
upon which relief can be granted, upon the grounds that the | 
Complaint has failed to join Swisher Coal Company as an indispens-
able party, and upon the following specific grounds: 
(a) Trail Mountain Coal Company has recently been acquired I 
by Diamond Shamrock Chemical Company, who is the real party in j 
interest, and for the further reason that the operation of the , 
mine and the ownership of the mine in question is under the con- . 
trol and direction of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company who, under the j 
provisions of Rule 17(a), should be the real party in interest in ! 
this action. I 
C-i.L.I S 
^ P 7 !! n-i 
(b) Under Count Vr Trail Mountain seeks damages as a third-
party beneficiary under a Nevada Power Company/Swisher Coal 
Company Contractr Exhibit B, when under the law and under the pro-
visions of the applicable contracts, Exhibits A, B, & C, Trail 
Mountain's claim, if anyr is against Swisher Coal Company, requir-
ing Swisher as an indispensable party in this action. 
(c) The Complaint is seeking specific performance under both 
a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction and fails to 
state relief justifying injunctive relief in the following partic-
ulars: 
(i) There is no allegation of an inadequate remedy at 
law, but to the contrary, the Complaint claims ascertainable 
damages for breach of contract. 
(ii) There are no allegations of an immediate irrepar-
able injury. Instead, the claim is only for future and 
clearly speculative events, rather than immediate causal fac-
tors. 
(iii) There are no allegations showing the probability 
of success on the merits. 
(iv) The public policy and irreparable injury allega-
tions of paragraphs 27 and 62 are either immaterial to the 
injunction proceeding or are clearly eliminated by Trail 
Mountain1s compliance with existing mining statutes and regu-
lations set forth under 30 C.P.R. 75.1171-1, 75.1171-3, 
75.325 and 30 C.F.R. 75.330. 
T>E, PRATT. 
s ft CAHOON 
RNEYS AT LAW 
ERICAN SAVINGS 
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(v) There are no allegations that the relative hard-
ship to the defendant, notwithstanding the bond, is less than 
on the plaintiff. 
(d) The action claiming modification of the contract and 
waiver of quality requirements is barred by the provisions of 
U.C.A. 70A-2-612 and further by Section 13 of the contract, 
Exhibit A to the Complaint, which provides inter alia, that the 
failure of either party to insist upon strict performance shall 
not be construed as a waiver of such provisions, but such provi-
sions shall continue in full force and effect. 
By way of further answer to the Complaint, this defendant 
admits, denies and alleges as follows in response to the specific 
paragraphs set forth in the Complaint. 
I. 
DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Denies the allegations of paragraph 1, but admits that 
Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah; and alleges affirmatively 
that the Diamond Shamrock Coal Company is the operator of the 
Trail Mountain Coal mine. 
2. Admits the allegations of paragraph 2. 
3. Admits the allegations of paragraph 3. 
4. Admits the allegations of paragraph 4. 
5. Admits the allegations of paragraph 5. 
6. Admits the allegations of paragraph 6. 
E. PRATT. 
& C A H O O N 
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7. Denies the allegations of paragraph 7. 
8. Admits the allegations of paragraph 8. 
II. 
FACTS 
9. Admits that on or about March 1, 1980, defendant and 
plaintiff entered int^ a Coal Sales Agreement, a true copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit A, but alleges further that said 
Agreement was modified by an Amendment thereto also dated March 1, 
1980, which has not been attached to the Exhibit A, and denies all 
other allegations of paragraph 9. 
10. Admits that Trail Mountain agreed to sell and Nevada 
agreed to purchase specified tonnages of coal per year for the 
term of the contract; admits that for the year 1983 and subsequent 
years that under certain conditions the quantity could be reduced 
to 200,000 tons per year at the election of NPC; alleges that 
under Section 3 of the Contract, the quantities were reduced to 
200,000 tons and to 100,000 tons in particular years; and denies 
all other allegations of paragraph 10. Defendant alleges affirma-
tively that the coal had to meet certain specific sodium require-
ments and certain specific ash fusion temperature requirements, 
and that Nevada Power had the right under the contract to suspend 
further delivery and purchase of coal which did not meet such 
requirements on two consecutive deliveries. Said provision in 
substance provides that the contract could be terminated for 
cause. Absent justifiable cause, the term of the contract was 
DE. PRATT. 
& C A H O O N 
NEYS AT LAW 
RICAN SAVINGS 
PLAZA M 
indefinite, but could be terminated for other than cause at any 
time after bei:emh I-I 'II 1 i i| • fc •' years prior written 
not ice. 
>:3mitG t h ^ a l l p ' i ^ i o n s »i aqr #» ph ** ! * a l l e g e s 
a f f i r m a t i v e l y " ' « ' i ' , l nimum t e m p e r a -
t u r e of 2 ,200 d e g r e e s P a h r e n h e i i I i ui1 h fus i m, 
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Group , I n» , r a i l i e i L nan 1 , ' l i t i i i Mountain , MM l i 
Group would be a p r o p e r and n e c e s s a r y p l a i n t i f f h e r e i n , in ii* i i I 
o r in HI I I I in in in in I in in I in in in i mi mi I i IIIII in l in in nf (ha t Swisher foa l 
< TMany i s a l s o j o i n e d as .1 f\n 1 , "t " * i« j 1.1 ,, uii*l- ' ' i 
i ifini 1 i i i i lr 
1 5 . liuimi'i mil i i ' i I r ov flc»n 
18 . Denies tin-1 a l l e g a t i o n s i I i * * i u ih M ami 11 I« qt i 
IIW,. ||M I I I, I, 11,1, i i i iiiciii MounLaiu i t p r e s e n t e d Lu Nevada Powi i 
prior to execution of the Trail Mountain-Nevada Power Coal Sale 
Agreement that the coal would meet the maximum of 3 percent sodium 
content in its ash and said term was thereupon agreed to and 
placed in the contract. Trail Mountain, as it has alleged in 
paragraph 16, continually shipped coal having in excess of said 
maximum percentage of 3 percent sodium, knowing that the coal did 
not meet 3 percent sodium requirement, and at no time informed 
Nevada Power that said coal did not meet said requirement. From 
time to time the Trail Mountain coal had various deficiencies in 
it which caused operating problems and which deficiencies were 
contrary to the quality specifications set forth in the contract 
and Nevada Power, in August, 1981, found that at- ipast- nn* ship-
ment of Trail Mountain Coal did not meet the 3 percent maximum 
sodium percentage requirement and so informed Trail Mountain. 
However, Trail Mountain, at that time and throughout the contract, 
continued to assure Nevada Power that its coal did meet all the 
requirments under the contract. In late 1983 Nevada Power had 
increasingly excessive shutdowns because of "slagging*1 in its 
boilers and questioned ARCO concerning its coal supply. There-
after in order to attempt to isolate the cause of the increasing 
slagging, Nevada Power undertook tests in early March, 1984, of 
the five consecutive shipments made by Trail Mountain in January, 
February, and March, 1984. Said tests showed that all five train 
loads exceeded the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide ash content. 
Immediately upon learning for the first time that the Trail Moun-
tain coal was consistently higher than the maximum sodium content 
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20. Denies the allegations of paragraph 20, and alleges that 
Trail Mountain responded to the letter suggesting the reduction by 
requesting an unreasonable increase of the contract minimum to 
500,000 tons of coal. Upon receipt of this request, Nevada Power 
simply did not pursue the matter further and left it up to Trail 
Mountain whether or not Trail Mountain would voluntarily reduce 
its sale by 15 percent and Trail Mountain elected not to do so. 
21. Denies the allegations of paragraph 21 as alleged in the 
Complaint and affirmatively alleges and admits that there had been 
several complaints throughout the years concerning coal quality 
which complaints were both in writing and oral. Admits that in 
approximately 1983 Nevada Power informed Trail Mountain that its 
coal might not comply with the sodium oxide specification; admits 
that on March 20, 1984, Nevada Power informed Trail Mountain by 
letter that further shipments of such coal would be suspended 
unless and until the sodium oxide specification was met. Defen-
dant alleges that Trail Mountain knew prior to negotiating the 
contract that its coal did not comply with the 3 percent sodium 
oxide specification and continually maintained that its coal was 
meeting all contract specifications, even though there was a con-
tinuous objection to the quality of the Trail Mountain coal for 
various reasons. Defendant further alleges that it was not until 
the testing of the specific Trail Mountain train loads delivered 
during January, February, and March of 1984 that it was determined 
that Trail Mountain coal was causing the slagging and shutdown of 
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meet the sodium test and informed plaintiff that the coal pur-
chases would be suspended in accordance with the contract provi-
sions until the contract specifications could be met. Plaintiff 
thereupon confirmed through its own test that its coal would not 
meet the specification. No effort was made by plaintiff to remedy 
the defective coal -and on April 27, 1984, plaintiff was further 
notified by letter that unless Trail Mountain furnished evidence 
that the coal mixture would meet the quality specifications of the 
agreement by August 1, 1984, that Nevada Power would consider the 
agreement to be cancelled. Said notice was a reasonable notice 
and in accordance with Section 4.3 of the agreement between the 
parties. 
26. Denies the allegations of paragraph 26 and alleges 
affirmatively that all of the alleged money damages are specula-
tive and without substance and alleges further that the plaintiff 
has failed and refused to mitigate any alleged losses by refusing 
to correct the deficient coal supply and by failing and refusing 
to find other purchasers for said coal. Defendant alleges that 
the claimed damages are not the result of any breach of contract, 
but are purely and simply imaginative and without foundation. 
27. Denies the allegations of paragraph 27, and alleges that 
the claimed "irreparable injuries" are not irreparable, that the 
alleged difficulties are properly resolved and eliminated if the 
plaintiff complies with the applicable Federal Coal Regulations, 
including, but not limited to the provisions of 30 C.F.R. 
75.1171-1, 75.1171-3, 30 C.F.R. 75.325 and 30 C.F.R. 75.330. 
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in excess of $64,000 per day per boilerf added repair and mainten-
ance costs and a reduction in plant efficiency. 
31. Denies the allegations of paragraph 31 and alleges that 
the plaintiff, by failing and refusing to comply with the contract 
specifications after reasonable and proper notice to the plaintiff 
to so comply, materially breached the contract by refusing to fur-
nish coal in accordance with the contract specifications, thus 
entitling the defendant to terminate the contract in accordance 
with paragraph 4.3. 
Count II 
32. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges the admis-
sions, denials and allegations contained in its answers 1 through 
31 above. 
33. Denies the allegations of paragraph 33 and alleges that 
at such time as the defendant first was able to segregate the 
Trail Mountain coal from the other seven suppliers of coal and 
determine through testing that the Trail Mountain coal was defi-
cient in its sodium oxide requirement, defendant immediately noti-
fied plaintiff of such deficiency and requested that the plaintiff 
comply with the terms of the contract, all as is required and per-
mitted under the terms of the contract; and alleges further that 
from the inception of the contract in 1980, Trail Mountain, 
itself, knew of but failed to inform defendant of the fact that 
its coal did not meet this contract specification. 
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sions of paragraph 13 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract, 
plaintiff's claim for contract modification is barred. 
39. Denies the allegations of paragraph 39. 
40. Denies the allegations of paragraph 40, and alleges that 
Nevada Power at no time refused to accept any Trail Mountain coal 
that complied with the contract requirements, and alleges that 
Trail Mountain failed and refused to take any reasonable steps to 
correct its deficient coal and instead suggested impossible condi-
tions with its alleged offer to combine coal by alternating 
trucks. Defendant further alleges that plaintiff failed to take 
any of the available steps which were available which would have 
eliminated the problem, thus mitigating any losses completely. 
Count IV 
41. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations, admissions and denials set forth in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 40 above* 
42. Denies the allegations of paragraph 42, and alleges that 
even if there had been acquiescence and acceptance, which is 
denied by defendant, but which has been alleged by plaintiff, said 
acquiescence and acceptance does not modify the contract and does 
not lessen or eliminate any of the terms of the contract as is 
specifically provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code and 
under paragraph 13 of the contract. 
43. Denies the allegations of paragraph 43, and alleges that 
Trail Mountain knew at all times that its coal was deficient, 
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with ARCO coal if such coal met the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power 
quality specifications; and any claim for breach of contract or 
damages resulting therefrom is only applicable to the contract 
between the plaintiff and ARCO, and should therefore be dis-
missed. 
Count VI 
50. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations, admissions and denials contained in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 49 above. 
51. Admits the allegations of paragraph 51 insofar as it 
relates to the Coal Supply Agreement, Exhibit C, attached to the 
Complaint, but alleges that said contract speaks for itself and 
alleges further that in substance the contract has been assigned 
by the Fetterolf Group, Inc. 
52. Denies the allegations of paragraph 52. 
53. Denies the allegations of paragraph 53, and alleges fur-
ther that under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah and under the 
provisions of the contract, the Trail Mountain Coal Agreement has 
not been amended, nor have the quality requirements in any way 
been modified or reduced from those set forth in the original con-
tract. 
54. Denies the allegations of paragraph 54. 
55. Denies the allegations of paragraph 55, and alleges that 
Nevada Power has the right under its contract to not accept coal 
which does not meet the specification requirements set forth in 
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the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power Contract, i.e., a maximum of 3 
percent sodium oxide and a minimum of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit 
ash fusion temperature. 
Count VII 
56. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations, admissions and denials contained in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 55 above. 
57. Admits that paragraph 2.2 of the contract provides that 
Trail Mountain may provide substitute coal to NPC subject to NPC's 
approval, which approval will not be unreasonably withheld, but 
alleges that the said paragraph 2.2 also provides that such sub-
stitute coal shall be subject to all other terms and conditions of 
this agreement; and that Trail Mountain, in proposing to supply a 
mix of its coal and another supplier's coal, failed and refused to 
agree that said coal should comply with the quality specifications 
governing sodium oxide content and ash fusion temperatures, which 
provisions are some of the "other terms and conditions of this 
agreement"; and that defendant has not unreasonably withheld any 
approval because the plaintiff has not offered to supply such coal 
in accordance with the contract conditions. 
58. Admits that Trail Mountain offered a substitute mixture 
of its coal and another supplier's coal, but denies all other 
allegations of paragraph 58, and specifically denies that such an 
offer was made in good faith because the plaintiff always knew its 
coal could not comply with the specification and also refused to 
have said coal comply with the contract specifications. Defendant 
further alleges that said offer to substitute coal was made within 
just a few days prior to the termination date set by the defendant 
as August 1, 1984, without any attempt to satisfy defendant that 
said coal could meet the specifications; and that prior thereto in 
April, 1984, plaintiff's own testing laboratory had determined 
that plaintifffs coal could not meet the contract specifications. 
59. Denies the allegations of paragraph 59 and alleges that 
the only condition indicated by the defendant was that the coal 
would have to meet the contract requirements, and that such a con-
dition was reasonable and in accordance with the contract, was 
workable since plaintiff could have properly mixed such coal with 
proper blending to come up with a substitute coal, was not burden-
some in that the relative cost to be employed by the plaintiff to 
accomplish a coal meeting specification was readily available to 
the plaintiff, and that said condition was in no way oppressive, 
in that the plaintiff could easily and readily have undertaken 
the steps to make the coal comply with the specification, but 
refused to do so. 
60. Denies the allegations of paragraph 60 and alleges fur-
ther that defendant has at all times been ready, willing and able 
to continue the contract performance with the plaintiff, had the 
plaintiff furnished coal to meet the contract specifications, and 
alleges further that Trail Mountain has failed and refused to 
mitigate its claimed damages, either by effectively blending the 
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coal or by seeking other purchasers, both of which remedies have 
been and are readily available. 
Count VIII 
61. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations, admissions and denials hereinabove set forth in 
its answer under paragraphs 1 through 60 above. 
62. Denies the allegations of paragraph 62, and alleges that 
these allegations have been specifically and generally denied 
heretofore and to the extent that they have not, defendant herein 
denies specifically and generally all allegations of this para-
graph 62. 
63. Denies the allegations of paragraph 63, and alleges that 
the plaintiff has neither alleged a cause of action for a prelim-
inary or a permanent injunction, has admitted that it breached the 
contract, and has so breached since the inception of the contract 
by refusing to furnish coal meeting the contract specification. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. Nevada Power constructed the Reid-Gardner Plant in four 
different generating boilers, the order of construction and plac-
ing said boilers on line for generation was as follows: 
No. 1 boiler: Placed on line June 30, 1965; 
No. 2 boiler: Placed on line June 1, 1968; 
No. 3 boiler: Placed on line May 30, 1976; and 
PRATT, 
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No. 4 boiler: Placed on line July 26, 1983. 
Boilers 1, 2, and 3 have particular specifications requiring that 
coal used in the firing of said boilers would have a maximum of 3 
percent sodium oxide in the ash and would require a minimum ash 
fusion temperature of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit, along with other 
specific requirements. The Trail Mountain coal was purchased 
specifically for use in boilers 1, 2, and 3. Separate coal con-
tracts were entered into with other suppliers to furnish coal for 
Boiler Unit No. 4. Nevada Power is unable to use coal in Units 1, 
2, and 3 which does not meet the above specifications. 
2. Plaintiff was informed, during negotiations and prior to 
execution of the contract of the fact, that Nevada Power's Reid 
Gardner Generating Plants, boilers 1, 2, and 3 were constructed in 
such a way that they could only be operated with coal having 3 
percent or less sodium oxide content in the ash and having ash 
fusion minimum temperatures of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit. Plain-
tiff represented to defendant in its written proposal to defendant 
prior to execution of the coal sales that its coal from the Trail 
Mountain mine met those specifications, and based upon these 
representations, defendant entered into the Coal Sale Agreement, 
Exhibit A, attached to the Complaint, in which said specifications 
were included. 
3. Defendant alleges upon information and belief that dur-
ing the contract negotiation plaintiff knew its coal would not 
meet the specification, and defendant further alleges that at the 
execution of the said contract and continuing thereafter to the 
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present timer plaintiff Trail Mountain knew that its coal did not 
meet the contract specifications concerning sodium oxide maximum 
percentages and ash fusion minimum temperatures. 
4. During performance of the contract, the defendant had 
continuous difficulty in maintaining its boilers, which difficulty 
was caused by the Trail Mountain coal, but which, through regular 
ASTM testing, and notwithstanding complaints to Trail Mountain, 
defendant was unable to determine the exact cause for the slagging 
and continued operational problems in the boilers. Notwithstand-
ing these complaints, the plaintiff continued to assure defendant 
that the coal met all contract specification requirements. 
5. In December, 1983, defendant encountered more serious 
and continuous outages than had occurred over the past years in 
its boiler operations, and conducted a thorough investigation and 
independent testing program to attempt to isolate the coal causing 
the problem and to isolate the problem. Said testing involved the 
samples from five consecutive shipments taken from the Trail Moun-
tain mine during the months of January, February and one sample in 
early March of 1984. From these tests it was concluded in March, 
1984, that Trail Mountain coal was substantially exceeding the 
sodium oxide maximum requirement of 3 percent and that this defi-
ciency was jeopardizing the operation of boilers 1, 2, and 3 in 
the Reid-Gardner plant. 
6. On March 19, 1984, immediately after making such deter-
mination, defendant, at a conference with Trail Mountain represen-
tatives, and again on March 20, 1984, by a letter attached as 
PRATT, 
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Exhibit 1 , suspended further Trail Mountain deliveries of coal 
until it was proven that Trail Mountain coal met the specifica-
tions. 
7. Thereafter, on April 16, 1984, Trail Mountain conducted 
its own independent testing of the coal and said tests showed that 
the Trail Mountain .coal could not meet the sodium oxide specifica-
tions under the contract. 
8. On April 27, 1984, after receiving the Trail Mountain 
test and because of the immediate urgency in keeping the plant in 
operation, Nevada Power gave written notice, in accordance with 
paragraph 4.3 of the contract, that Trail Mountain had until 
August 1, 1984, to show that the coal it was selling would meet 
the specification. See Exhibit 2 attached. 
9. On July 18, 1984, Trail Mountain offered to mix its coal 
with the higher grade of coal to be obtained from Tower Resources, 
another coal supplier in the area which had a low sodium content, 
and proposed to do this by simply alternating truck loads from the 
Trail Mountain mine and from the Tower Resources mine. Such a 
proposal was obviously unworkable for many reasons and did not 
show or attempt to show that the coal would meet the specifica-
tion, and on July 23, 1984, Nevada Power responded to the offer 
requesting evidence that the coal would meet the specifications, 
and at the same time questioned the practicality of such a mixing 
process using alternate truck loads. At all times since December 
1983, defendant has consistently informed plaintiff that the only 
requirement it has is that the coal be supplied in accordance with 
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the quality terms of the contract. However, the plaintiff, at the 
same time, by its July 30, 1984 letter, refused to undertake any 
more efforts to furnish coal in accordance with the contract or to 
furnish any proof that its coal would meet the specification, but 
to the contrary, maintained that the contract had now been modi-
fied by its consistent furnishing of subspecification materials 
over the past years, and the defendant thereafter, without further 
effort to mitigate its losses, to satisfy the contract require-
ments, commenced this lawsuit. 
10. Paragraph 4.3 of the contract provides that Nevada Power 
shall have the right to suspend further shipments of coal if two 
consecutive shipments of coal do not meet the quality specifica-
tions of paragraph 4.1, i.e., the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide 
ash content and the 2,200 minimum ash fusion temperature require-
ments. 
11. That Article 13 of the contract provides that the fail-
ure of either party to insist in any one or more instances upon 
strict performance of any of the provisions of the agreement or 
take advantage of any of its rights hereunder shall not contitute 
a waiver of any such provisions or the relinquishment of any such 
rights, and such provisions shall continue in full force and 
effect for the term of the agreement. By this paragraph, the 
plaintiff has agreed that, notwithstanding its delivery of sub-
specification coal, it nevertheless cannot modify the terms and 
conditions of the contract concerning quality of the coal, and the 
defendant by the same provisions and under the same circumstances, 
has the right to continue such provisions in full force and 
effect. The defendant continued in effect the coal quality con-
tract provisions, and the plaintiff materially breached those 
quality provisions by refusing to furnish the assurance that its 
coal would meet the specifications. 
12. Nevada Power cannot use coal in Units 1, 2, and 3 that 
does not meet the sodium and ash fusion specifications. Any such 
use results in slagging and in the ultimate shutdown of the boiler 
involved for a period of time while the boiler cools, while it is 
cleaned, and while it gets back into operation, all of which 
causes substantial extra cost, both in the remedying of the prob-
lem and in the necessary purchase of supplemental power to be used 
in lieu of that which otherwise would be generated by such 
boiler. 
13. Section 70A-2-209(5), U.C.A., provides in substance that 
a party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of 
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification 
that strict performance will be required of any term which has 
been waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a 
material change of position in reliance on the waiver. Thus, it 
is the defendant's position that even if there was any type of 
waiver as is alleged, the waiver has been retracted by an express 
and reasonable notice to Trail Mountain so indicating; and that at 
the same time there has been no change in position, either alleged 
or claimed by plaintiff in reliance on the waiver. 
RNEYS AT LAW 
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14. The claims of waiver and of breach of contract are 
therefore of no avail to the plaintiff and should be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
15. As an affirmative defense to the claim for injunctive 
relief, defendant realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 under the 
affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. 
16. Nevada Power is a public utility furnishing electric 
power to Clark County and portions of Nye County, Nevada, with 
220,000 consumers taking service from Nevada Power. The total 
generating capacity of Nevada Power is 1600 megawatts, and the 
actual connected base load to Nevada Power necessary to serve its 
customers is approximately 1300 megawatts. The Reid-Gardner Plant 
generating units 1, 2, and 3, supply 330 megawatts of power dedi-
cated to the base load requirements, which power serves a portion 
of Las Vegas, Nevada. Reid-Gardner boiler No. 4 generates 250 
megawatts. The consumers of Nevada Power include the large casi-
nos, such as the MGM Hotel, which requires 45 megawatts, about the 
equivalent of the power requirements of the City of St. George, 
Utah. 
17. All of the power of the Reid-Gardner plant is necessary 
for the complete service to Nevada Power's customers, and in the 
event that one of the boilers is shut down for a 24-hour period, 
the power must be purchased from some other source, and the cost 
.PRATT. of purchase power is approximately $128,000 per day per boiler, or 
.YS AT LAW 
$64,000 per day per boiler, in excess cost over and above the nor-
mal operating cost for said boiler for said period of time. 
18. Section 4.2 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract 
requires that the buyer shall test each train load by ASTM stan-
dards. Said testingf however, does not include testing for sodium 
oxide content, nor ash fusion minimum temperatures. The A.S.T.M. 
tests were carried on by Nevada Power for each of the train loads 
of the Trail Mountain coal as it left the mine yard. Testing for 
sodium and ash fusion cannot be accomplished at the mine yardf but 
can only be performed in a technical time consuming laboratory 
procedure at the Nevada delivery point. Under the contract Nevada 
took title at the Acco siding and therefore could not test for 
sodium and ash fusion until after it had received delivery at its 
plant. Nevada Power thus had to rely upon the Trail Mountain 
representation that the coal met the sodium and ash fusion 
requirement. 
19. Excessive sodium oxide ash content results in "slagging" 
of a boiler and said slagging eventually results in a loss of 
efficiency and eventually in a shutdown of that particular boiler, 
resulting in a loss in excess of $64,000 a day during the time 
that the boiler has to cool, has to be cleaned, and thereafter put 
back on the line in service. 
20. The allegations of the Complaint are couched in terms of 
futuristic and speculative loss of profits or the occurrence of 
damages apparently predicated over the full life of a contract 
extending on into the indefinite future. The allegations of the 
-26-
Complaint claim clearly that there are ascertainable contract dam-
ages in the event that Nevada Power breached the contract. 
21. Plaintiff's claim based upon irreparable injury shows no 
present danger to its existence or to the public and therefore 
fails as an allegation of the essential element of immediate 
irreparable harm. Said allegation fails to show that there is no 
adequate legal remedy.' 
22. In the balancing of relative hardships between the par-
ties, there is no allegation or claim that the plaintiff will 
immediately suffer any non-compensable hardship. The defendant, 
on the other hand, if it is forced to accept said coal which does 
not meet the specification requirements, will be forced to close 
its boilers and suffer for each boiler for each shutdown day the 
cost of purchased power over and above the cost of operating the 
boiler in an amount of $64,000; and that the relative hardships 
are fairly and substantially balanced in favor of the defendant, 
rather than in favor of the plaintiff. 
23. The policy considerations concerning mine safety or 
affecting the public interest are caused, if at all, not by the 
defendant terminating the contract, but by the plaintiff's failure 
to comply with the various mandatory safety requirements of 
Chapter 30 of the C.F.R., which governs the methods and procedures 
by which a mine is completely shutdown, partially shutdown, or 
continued in partial operation. The speculative hardships to the 
public do not exist, but for the improper or even negligent fail-
>E, PRATT. 
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ure of the plaintiff to comply with the procedures to be followed 
under the above regulations. 
24. The final defect in plaintiff's claim in equity is the 
plaintiff's failure to come into an equitable court with clean 
hands. The plaintiff entered into this contract after represent-
ing that its coal would meet the specifications, but nevertheless! 
knowing that the coal did not mee*- the specifications and continu-
ing to maintain that the coal met the specifications when, in 
fact, the coal did not. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM RELATIVE 
TO THE ARCO-TRAIL MOUNTAIN CONTRACT 
25. The ARCO-Trail Mountain contract provides that Trail 
Mountain shall sell and ARCO shall purchase 120,000 tons of coal 
per year. The plaintiff, in asking for an injunction "to require 
Nevada Power to inform immediately and instruct ARCO to accept 
delivery and pay for Trail Mountain coal . . ." requires Nevada 
Power to require specific performance by ARCO of its contract with 
Trail Mountain, notwithstanding that ARCO is not a party to this 
proceeding and will have its rights and liabilities determined by 
Nevada Power without proper representation. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the Complaint and each of its 
counts be dismissed with prejudice, defendant be awarded its costs 
incurred herein and be allowed such other relief as may be equit-
able under the circumstances. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
By way of counterclaim of Nevada Power Company against Trail 
Mountain Coal Company, Nevada Power alleges as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Nevada Power Company is a public utility with its prin-
cipal place of business at Las Vegas, Nevada, serving electric 
power to approximately 220r000 consumers and consumer connections 
in Clark County and in Nye County, Nevada, with the principal area 
of service at Las Vegas, Nevada. Nevada Power is authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah. 
2. Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation 
doing business in Utah, and defendant is informed and thus alleges 
that the said plaintiff is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shamrock 
Diamond Chemical Company. 
3. The defendant, Nevada Power Company, and the plaintiff, 
Trail Mountain Coal Company, entered into a Coal Sales Agreement 
on or about March 1, 1980, a copy of which is attached to the 
Complaint on file herein as Exhibit A, and which contract is 
incorporated herein by reference. On or about March 1, 1980, the 
parties also entered into a letter agreement which supplements the 
aforesaid Coal Sales Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 3, and is incorporated herein by reference. 
4. The defendant realleges paragraphs 1 through 25 in the 
affirmative defenses. 
5. By reason of the plaintiff's breach of the aforesaid 
Coal Sales contract by failing and refusing to furnish coal in 
accordance with the contract specifications, Nevada Power Company 
has been damaged by reason of its shutdown of elements in the 
Reid-Gardner Plant by an amount in excess of $64,000 per day for 
those days shutdown as a result of the failure of Trail Mountain 
to furnish the specified coal and an undetermined amount for 
repairs to the boilers; and that defendant will be further damaged 
in an amount yet to be determined representing the difference in 
price that defendant may have to pay between the Trail Mountain 
price and a substitute coal supplier. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Defendant Nevada Power Company realleges paragraphs 1 
through 5 in the First Cause of Action. 
2. Defendant seeks a declaratory judgment of this court 
determining' that the Coal Sales Agreement between the parties has 
been properly cancelled and of no legal effect Section 57 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as implemented by 28 U.S.C., 
Section 2201. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for a judgment in the amount of no 
less than $64,000 per day for every day that a unit of the Reid-
Gardner Plant is idle as a result of plaintiff's breach of the 
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contract, and a judgment determining that the Coal Sales Agreement 
of March 1, 1980, has been properly terminated. 
DATED this 7th day of September, 1984. 
CLYDE^RSA^, GIBBS & 
lott Lee Pratt 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nevada Power Company 
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bcc: B. Biersdor 
J . Smith 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY 
J A M E S H . Z O R N E S 
Vice P r e s i d e n t 
G e n e r a t i o n Engineering. 
C o n s t r u c t i o n . Operat ions 
March 20, 1984 
Diamond Shamrock Corporation 
1200 First Security Plaza 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507 
Attention: Mr. John Dragos 
Executive Vice President 
Dear Mr. Dragos: 
I am attaching the sodium oxide analysis of the coal shipped to us from 
Trail Mountain since the first of the year. It is readily apparent 
that we have an on-going problem with the coal not meeting the sodium 
oxide specification in the contract. 
This has caused us considerable problems with our units and several 
times forced us to shut the units down. 
Because of this I must invoke Section A.3 of our contract and suspend 
further shipments until such time as it can be proven that the Trail 
Mountain coal will meet all specifications included in the contract. 
Very truly yours, 
fies II. Zoxxyki 
Lee President 
Generation Engineering 
Construction, Operations 
JHZ:dm 
Attachment 
cc: J. Fielder 
R. Madsen 
/ 
(£Llg frLu ^ ^L A^^J 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY 
CERTIFIED MAIL NO.: 800547 J A M E S H. Z O R N E S 
V e t President 
Generation Engineering. 
Construction. Operations 
April 27, 1984 
Mr. John Dragos 
Executive Vice President 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales 
1200 First Security Plaza 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507 
Dear Mr. Dragos: 
As ve have previously indicated to you, coal shipments received since the 
first of the year by Nevada Power Company under the Coal Sales Agreement 
with your company have not met the minimum quality specifications of that 
Agreement. Deliveries of coal have been suspended. We have subsequently 
received information from you indicating that the inadequacy in quality may 
not be curable. 
Pursuant to Section 4.3 of the Coal Sales Agreement of March 1, 1980, 
Nevada Power Company is exercising its right to suspend shipments until 
evidence is produced that shipments will meet the quality specifications 
of the Agreement. Because of operational and commercial constraints, 
Nevada Power Company must receive such evidence prior to August 1, 1984. 
Should such evidence not be provided, Nevada Power will consider the Agree-
ment to be terminated. 
Very truly yours, 
sftl4l£>0 
J.^H. Zorn«, Vice President 
Generation Engineering, 
Construction and Operations 
/gpe 
bcc: CAL 
MGM 
DB 
RM 
n e 4 
F O U R T ; 
D A P O W E R C\ F.I P A N Y 
n S T R E E T A N D S T E W A R T A V E N U E 
P.O. BOX 2 3 0 • L A S V E G A S , N E V A D A - 8 9 1 51 
March 1, I960 
Trail fountain Coal Company* 
P. O. Box 34 
Somerset:, PA 15501 
Gentlemen: 
Letter Agreement 
In further consideration of the Coal Sales Agreement between the parties 
of ftarch 1, 1980, Trail Mountain aqrees to fulfill certain of Nevada's ob-
ligations with regard to delivery of coal to Swisher Coal.Company under Lhe 
Agreement for Loading Services between Swisher Coal Company and Nevada Power 
Cor.pany dated :-:arch 1, 1SS0, to wit: 
••Purchaser shall have delivered, by truck to Seller at the raw-coal stor-
age facility. Purchaser's coal for conveyance to the unit-train loadinq 
facility in anounts whereby at least two (2) times the tonnage that is re-
quired to load one (1) unit train is available in the storaqe area twelve 
(12) hours prior to the beginning of the load cycle for any unit train -
scheduled. The Seller will provide and maintain storage space' at the 
Facilities for Purchaser's coal for a minimum of three (3) times the 
quantity of coal required to load one (1) unit train.*4 
Tne above obligation shall be limited by the following force majeure 
provisions: 
•"Force Majeure** as used herein shall mean a cause reasonably beyond the 
control of the Seller or Purchaser, as the case nay be, which wholly or in 
substantial part prevents loading at the Facilities or the delivery of 
coal to the Facilities by Purchaser. Examples (without limitations) of 
foice majeure, but only if reasonably beyond the control of the Seller or 
Purchaser, as the case may be, are the following: acts of God; acts of 
the public enemy; insurrectioniVriots; strikes, labor disputes; work 
stoppages; fires; explosions; floods; electric power failures; major 
breakdowns or dar.aqe to equipment; interruptions of transportation; em-
bargoes; and orders or acts of governmental (including, without limita-
tion, a city or county ordinance, an act of a state legislature, an act of 
the United States Congress and a final Judicial decision, order or decree 
based upon order or acts of aovernmental authorities); or military author-
ity. 
T r a i l M f t i m t ' a i n f o a l P r m n a n v 2 March 1, 1980 
"If, because of force majeure, either Purchaser or Seller is unable to 
carry out its oblications under this Agreement, and if such party promptly 
gives the other party hereto written notice of such force majeure, the ob-
ligations and liabilities of the party giving such .notice and the cor-
responding oblications of the other party shall be suspended to the extent 
nvade necessary by and during the continuance of such force majeure; 
provided however, that the disabling effects of such force majeure shall 
be eliminated as soon as, and to the extent possible (except that either 
party r.ay settle any of its ovn labor disputes, strikes, or terminate any 
of its own lockouts in its sole discretion).** 
If you concur with the above, please sign as provided below. 
Very truly yours, 
Gibbs 
e Vice President 
Approved and Accepted this 
1st day of March, 1980. 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY 
APPENDIX 3 
AMENDED COMPLAINT (JURY DEMANDED) 
Williaa B. Bohling 
Randall N. Skanchy, of 
JOKES, WALDO, HOLBROOK k McDONOUGH. P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a : 
California corporation, : 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, : (JURY DEMANDED) 
t 
vs. : 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, & : Civil No. C-84-06B6A 
Nevada corporation, and : 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, s 
a Pennsylvania corporation, s 
Defendants. s 
Plaintiff, Trail Mountain Coal Company, through its 
counsel of record, hereby complains of the defendants Nevada 
Power Conpany and Atlantic Richfield Company, as follows: 
I. DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
!• Plaintiff• Trail Mountain Coal Conpany 
(hereinafter referred to as HTrail Mountain"), is and was at 
all times material hereto, a California corporation with its 
principal place of business in Enery County, State of Utah* 
Trail Mountain owns and operates the Trail Mountain Coal Mine 
located in Emery County, State of Utah* 
2. Defendant Nevada Fewer Company (hereinafter 
referred to as "ti?C"), is and was at all times material hereto 
a Nevada corporation, with its principal place of business in 
the state of Nevada, 
3. NPC is and was at all times material hereto 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and was doing 
business on a regular basis within the State of Utah, and this 
Court has general in personam jurisdiction over NPC for all 
purposes• 
4. Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company (hereinafter 
referred to as "ARCO"), is and was at all tines material hereto 
a Pennsylvania corporation/ with its principal place of 
business in the state of Pennsylvania* 
5* ARCO is and was at all times material hereto 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and was doing 
business on a regular basis within the State of Utah/ and this 
Court has general in personam jurisdiction over ARCO for all 
purposes* ARCO owns and operates the Swisher Coal Company, a 
Utah corporation involved in the production of coal, located in 
Carbon County, State of Utah* 
6, The contracts on which Trail Mountain's claims 
against NPC and ARCO are founded are to be performed by 
Plaintiff and Defendants in the State of Utah, 
1. The contracts on which Trail Mountain's claims 
against NPC and ARCO are founded provides that Plaintiff was to 
supply and NPC and ARCO were to receive coal in the State of 
Utah pursuant to such contracts. 
8* The contracts on which Trail Mountain's claims 
against NPC and ARCO are founded provide that the contracts are 
to be construed and performed in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah applicable to agreements made and to be 
performed in the State of Utah. 
9. NPC has neglected, refused and otherwise failed 
to perform in accordance with the provisions of such contract, 
causing injury to Trail Mountain and others in the State of 
Utah. 
10. ARCO has neglected, refused and otherwise failed 
to perform in accordance with the provisions of such contract, 
causing injury to Trail Mountain and others in the State of 
Utah. 
11. This Court has jurisdiction over all claims set 
forth herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by virtue of the fact 
that plaintiff and defendants are citizens of different states 
and the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, 
exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). Venue ia properly 
before this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391* 
11 > FACTS 
12. On or about March 1, 1980f NPC and Trail Mountain 
entered into a ccal sales agreement, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference (the "Trail Mountain/tfPC Contract"). 
13. Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC 
agreed to purchase from Trail Mountain specified tonnages of 
coal per year for the indefinite term of the contract. For 
calendar years 1983 and thereafter, NPC was required to 
purchase 300,000 tons of coal from Trail Mountain, but which 
quantity could be reduced to 200,000 tons per year at m?C's 
election* The contract could not be terminated prior to 
'Decenber 31, 1994, and then only upon two years prior written 
notice. 
14. The contract listed, among other specifications 
for the coal, a three percent raaxinuin sodiun oxide content in 
the ash. 
15, Swisher Coal Company, a Utah corporation, and a 
wholly owned subsidiary of ARCO, and NPr entered into a coal 
supply agreement dated as of March 1, 1980/ a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit HB" and 
incorporated herein by this reference (hereinafter referred to 
as the "ARCO/NPC Contract"). 
16* Pursuant to the ARCO/NPC Contract, NPC agreed to 
purchase between 225,000 and 275,000 tons of coal per year from 
ARCO, which coal was a blend of coal including coal to be 
purchased by ARCO frcra Trail Mountain. 
17. As an integral part of the ARCO/NPC Contract, 
Trail Mountain and ARCO entered into a coal supply agreement 
dated as of January 3, 1980, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "Cn and incorporated herein by 
this reference {hereinafter referred to as the "Trail 
Mountain/ARCO Contract")• 
IB. Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, 
ARCO agreed to purchase 120,000 tons of coal per year frora 
Trail Mountain from January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1994. 
19. Since the inception of the Trail Mountain/tJPC and 
Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts in early 1980, Trail Mountain has 
consistently shipped the tonnage of coal required pursuant to 
each contract, while the sodium oxide content of the ash in the 
Trail Mountain reserves has consistently exceeded three 
percent. At no time prior to late 1983, did NPC complain or 
otherwise object to the 'sodiura oxide content of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal* ARCG itself has newer objected to the sodium 
content of Trail Mountain Mine coal, and ARCO did not 
communicate any objection froa NPC until May 1984, All such 
monthly shipments prior to such dates were accepted and paid 
for as full compliance with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and 
the Trial Mountain/ARCO Contract. 
20. As late as January 1984, officials frora NPC told 
Trail Mountain personnel that the quality of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal was very good and that they were very pleased with 
Trail Mountain Mine coal* 
21. Pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, NPC 
requested that the annual shipments of coal for calendar year 
1983 be reduced frora 300,000 to 200,000 tons. Trail Mountain 
complied with this request. 
22. On August 13, 1983, NPC requested that Trail 
'Mountain voluntarily reduce coal shipments by an additional 15% 
below the 200,000 ton minimum contained in the contract. NPC 
apparently sought this reduction because abundant river flows 
had generated excess hydro-electric power, which power, on 
information and belief, is less expensive than coal-generated 
23, Trail Mountain informed NPC that a reduction of 
the Trail Mountain Mine's production by an additional 15% would 
mean lowering production to an uneconomical operational level, 
and expressed to NPC a willingness to reduce its production by 
15% if NPC would make certain concessions to Trail Mountain, 
NPC refused to make such concessions, but continued to insist 
that Trail Mountain reduce its coal shipments by 15% below the 
minimum specified in the Trail Kountain/NPC Contract. No 
agreenent to alter the contract was reached by Trail Mountain 
and NPC* 
24, In late 1983, for the first tine, NPC informed 
Trail Mountain that the coal frorr, the Trail Mountain Mine 
allegedly did not comply with the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract 
specifications because of a high sodium oxide content, and on 
March 20, 1984, NPC informed Trail Mountain that further 
shipments of Trail Mountain Mine coal must be suspended unless 
all specifications, including sodium oxide content were met, 
25, In May 1984, ARCO informed Trail Mountain that 
NPC had notified ARCO that the coal from the Trail Mountain 
Mine was unsatisfactory to NPC* ARCO suspended shipments under 
the Trail Mountain/ARCO agreenent because of NPC's complaints, 
and ARCO refused to accept further delivery of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal. 
26• Negotiations between Trail Mountain and NFC took 
place during the spring and summer of 1984* Solely as an 
accommodation to NPC, and not as an admission of any obligation 
pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, Trail .Mountain 
succeeded in locating a coal supplier whose coal could be mixed 
with Trail Mountain's coal and achieve a mix with a maximum 
sodium oxide content of less than three percent* Consequently, 
Trail Mountain offered to supply a 50/50 mix of Trail Mountain 
coal and substitute coal to NFC pursuant to the provisions of 
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contractr and thus provide coal in 
strict conformity with the language of the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract as originally drafted. 
27 • NFC's response to this substitute coal offer was 
to permit such substitution and blending of the coal, but not 
without imposing additional unreasonable conditions upon Trail 
Mountain that are not contained in the Contractr including but 
not limited to, requiring "perfect blending", a guaranty that 
the blended coal would not adversely affect operations of the 
.Reid Gardner units4 an agreement that Trail Mountain pay $1000 
per day for damages to the Reid Gardner units# and a reduction 
in the price for the coal. 
28. Subsequentlyi NPC withdrew the additional 
unreasonable conditions to the coal substitution proposal/ but 
stated that HPC did not accept the substitution proposal and 
terminated the Trail Mountain/UPC Contract effective August 1, 
1984. 
29. As a direct and proximate result of NPC's breach 
and wrongful acts, Trail Mountain will suffer money danages as 
follows: 
a. Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract in an anount of no less than Ten Million One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($10,100,000.00); 
b. Ldst profits from the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract in an amount of no less than Seven Million 
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($7,250,000.00); 
c# The wrongful termination of the Trail 
Mountain/NPC and Trail Mountain/ARCO Contracts will 
necessitate the closing of the Trail Mountain Mine, 
which will result in a loss of sales of Trail Mountain 
coal to third parties causing damages of not less than 
Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00); 
d. Damages directly resulting from closing 
costs of the nine* idle costs, personnel severance and 
other costs, lease obligations and related expenses in 
an amount of not less than Nine Million Dollars 
($9,000,000.00): 
e. Other incidental and consequential danages 
in an amount of not less than Ten Million Dollars 
($10,000,000.00), 
30. As a direct and proximate result of ARCO's breach 
and wrongful acts. Trail Mountain will suffer money damages as 
follows: 
a. Lost profits from the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract in an amount of no less than Seven Million 
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars (£7,250,000.00)? 
b. The wrongful termination of the Trail 
Mountain/ARCO Contract will necessitate the closing of 
the Trail Mountain Mine, which will result in a loss 
of sales of Trail Mountain coal to third parties 
causing damages of not less than Ten Million Dollars 
($10,000,000.00); 
c. Damages directly resulting fron closing 
costs of the mine, idle costs, personnel severance and 
other costs, lease obligations and related expenses in 
an amount of not less than Nine Million Dollars 
($9.000,000*00); 
d. Other incidental and consequential damages 
in an amount of not less than Ten Million Dollars 
(310,000,000.00). 
31. If NPC is not innediately required to accept 
delivery of and pay for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the 
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract and accept deliveries of coal under 
the ARCO/NPC Contract including Trail Mountain coal, the 
following irreparable injuries will be incurred by Trail 
Mountain, third parties, and the public: 
a. Trail Mountain will be required to close the 
nine* While Trail Mountain would comply with all laws 
relating to mine safety procedures, closure of the 
nine will probably result in the fresh air equipment 
being shut off or removed, temperature changes within 
the cine, carbon dioxide collection in the mine unless 
fan equipment is continuously operated, and as a 
result the nine infrastructure will likely 
deteriorate, thus increasing the risk of the mine 
becoming a health hazard to the public in and around 
the mine area, and increasing the health hazards and 
risks associated with any reopening and work to be 
done within the mine; 
b* Closing of the mine will likely result in a 
decrease or discontinuance of the maintenance of the 
mine4* infrastructure and all equipnent left within 
the mine* Increased moisture will collect in the 
mine, and the possibility of infrastructure and 
equipment failure will increase, increasing the risk 
of safety hazards to persons and the public in and 
around the mine area, and increasing the dangers and 
risks upon any reopening or work to be performed 
within the mine; 
c. Closing of the mine will result in the loss 
of the mine's experienced work force, which has a low 
injury rate, and valuable training and experience in 
the Trail Mountain mine* This work force is difficult 
to replace and cannot be compensated with money 
damages, and any reopening of the mine with a new work 
force that is less highly trained and less familiar 
with this particular mine will increase the risks and 
danger to such work force and others and the public in 
and around the mine upon any reopening or work to be 
done within the mine. The mine workers, who will be 
laid off during a time of a depressed coal marketr 
will suffer direct and irreparable injury. 
Ill, CAUSES OF ACTIOS 
COUNT 1 
32. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 31 above. 
33* The Trail Mountain/NPC Contract is an 
"installment contract" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann* 
§ 70A-2-612. 
34. The monthly coal shipments from Trail Mountain to 
ti?C substantially conform to all material provisions of the 
Trail Kountain/tfPC Contract, and the sodium oxide content of 
Trail Mountain coal does not substantially impair the value of 
any .one or all installments of coal shipped to NPC# 
35. By KPC1s refusal to accept delivery of Trail 
Mountain Mine coalf NPC has breached the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract and is liable to Trail Mountain for such breach of 
contract in an amount' to be determined at the trial of this 
action, 
COUNT II 
36. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained 
in paragraphs 1 through 3 5 above• 
37. $T>C consistently accepted delivery of Trail 
Mountain coal during the first four years of the contractf and 
•Trail Mountain continued to rely upon such acceptance by NPC 
and performed in accordance with the contract* 
38* NPC sought to breach the contract by requiring 
Trail Mountain to reduce coal shipments by fifteen percent 
belcw the minimum amount specified in the Contract, apparently 
in response to and as a result of NPC's ability to buy 
hydro-electric power at cheaper rates* 
39- When Trail Mountain refused to allow NPC to 
breach the Contract by reducing coal shipments# NPC utilized 
the alleged failure to meet the sodium oxide content criteria 
in the Contract as a subterfuge for the improper purpose of 
eliminating all shipments of coal under the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract, 
40. By virtue of the acts complained of herein, NPC 
breached the Trail Mountain/HFC Contract and breached its 
obligations of fair dealing, reasonableness and good faith 
contained explicitly 'and implicitly in the Contract and as 
prescribed by statute, for which breach Trail Mountain is 
entitled to damages from NPC in an amount to be determined at 
the trial of this action. 
COUNT III 
41. Plaintiff incorporates herein the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 40 above• 
42* During the four year course of performance and 
course of dealing pursuant to the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, 
Trail Mountain's shipments of coal from the Trail Mountain Mine 
and acceptance and payment for such coal by NPC, established 
the terms of the Contract and the conformance of Trail Mountain 
Mine coal in accordance with the ContrwCt. 
43. The course of performance and course of dealing 
between NPC and Trail Mountain with respect to the Contract 
modified such contract to eliminate a specific sodium oxide 
content requirement for Trail Mountain Mine coal and such 
contract provides that Trail Mountain coal is acceptable and in 
conformance with such modified contractual provisions. 
44. HFC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal 
is in breach of the NPC Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled 
to damages from NPC in an amount to be deterained at the trial 
of this action. 
COUNT IV 
45. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations in paragraphs 1 through 44 above* 
46* During the four years of performance pursuant to 
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, whereby Trail Mountain 
supplied coal to NPC, NPC has waived any requirement that 
soaium oxide in the Trail Mountain Mine coal ash be less than 
three percent through its acquiescence and acceptance of Trail 
Mountain Mine coal as performance pursuant to the Contract. 
47. Trail Mountain relied on the waiver of the sodium 
oxide content specifications to the detriment of Trail M m m f a ^ 
byt among other things, Trail Mountain's failure to see* or 
accept alternative contracts or purchasers for Trail Mountain 
Mine coal during the course of the four years of performance 
pursuant to the KPC Contract; and Trail Mountain's reopening, 
maintaining and operating of the mine* 
48. NPC has waived any requirement that sodium oxide 
content in Trail Mountain Mine coal not exceed three percent, 
and MPC's refusal to accept Trail Mountain Mine coal with a 
sodium oxide content in excess of three percent is a breach of 
the Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an 
anount to be determined at trial. 
COUNT V 
49. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 48 above* 
50. - The Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract is an 
"installment contract" within the meaning of the Utah Code Ann* 
§ 70A-2-612. 
51. The monthly coal shipments from Trail Mountain to 
ARCO substantially conform to all material provisions of the 
Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, 
52 «. By ARCO* s refusal to accept delivery of Trail 
Mountain Mine coal, ARCO has breached the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract and is liable to Trail Mountain for such breach of 
contract in &n amount to be determined at the trial of this 
action* 
COUNT VI 
53* Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 52 above. 
54* ARCO has refused to accept shipments of Trail 
Mountain coal because NPC informed ARCO that Trail Mountain 
Mine coal is unacceptable for use in NPC's Feid Gardner station* 
55. The coal from the Trail Mountain Mine is in 
conformance with the ARCO/NPC Contract and the Trail 
Mountain/AJRCO Contract, and NFC's refusal to accept Trail 
Mountain Mine coal through its blending with ARCO coal is a 
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract of which Trail Mountain is an 
intended third-party beneficiaTy. 
56. .The terms of the ARCO/NPC Contract that coal 
supplied to NPC must be satisfactory for use at the Reid 
Gardner station has been contemporaneously interpreted during 
the term of that contract and Trail Mountain mine coal has 
consistently been and remains satisfactory for use by NPC, and 
NPC has waived any requirement# if any* that such coal contain 
a sodium oxide content not exceeding three percent. 
57. NPC's refusal to accept coal from the Trail 
Mountain Mine to be blended with ARCO coal pursuant to the 
ARCO/NPC Contract is a breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract, and 
Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial, 
COUNT VII 
58* Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 above. 
59. The Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract provides that 
ARCO. will purchase from Trail Mountain a minimum of 120/000 
tons of coal per year, and that such coal should be 
satisfactory for use in NPC's Reid Gardner plant. 
CO. Trail Mountain Mine coal is satisfactory for use 
at NPC'8 Reid Gardner'plant. 
61. WPC has, during the first four years of the 
ARCO/NPC Contract, accepted Trail Mountain coal for use at 
NPC's Peid Gardner plant, and through this course of 
performance has established Trail Mountain coal as satisfactory 
for use at the Reid Gardner plant. 
62. NPC has wrongfully induced ARCO to refuse to 
"accept delivery cf Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail 
Kountain/ARCO Contract• 
63. NPC%s interference with and inducement to breach 
the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract has caused direct, incidental 
and consequential damages to Trail Mountain, and Trail Mountain 
is entitled to money damages against NPC in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
COUNT VIII 
64. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through €3 above. 
65. Paragraph 2,2 of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract 
provides that Trail Mountain has the right to supply substitute 
coal to NPC, subject to NPC's approval, which approval will not 
be unreasonably withheld. 
66. Trail Mountain offered to NPC a substitute 
mixture of its coal and another supplier's ccal with an 
aggregate sodium oxide content under three percentf not as an 
adaission of any requirement in the contract that coal have a 
sodium oxide content of less than three percent, but solely as 
an accommodation to NPC and in an effort to deal in good faith 
to ireet the demands of NPC. 
67. NPC refused to accept such substitute coal 
without conditions that were not set forth or contemplated in 
the NPC Contract, and which conditions were unreasonable! 
unworkable, burdensome and oppressive. 
68. NPC's refusal to accept substitute coal from 
Trail Mountain constitutes a breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC 
Contract and Trail Mountain is entitled to damages in an amount 
to be determined at trial. 
COUNT IX 
69. riaintiff incorporates herein by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 68 above. 
70. NPC's breach of the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract 
as set forth in Counts I, II, III, IV, and VII above $ and NPC's 
breach of the ARCO/NPC Contract in which Trail Mountain is a 
third-party beneficiary, and NPC's improper interference with 
the Trail Mountain/ARCO Contract, will result in immediate 
irreparable damages to Trail Mountain, third parties and the 
public, by increasing the risks and dangers of the Trail 
Mountain Mine by increasing the deterioration of the 
infra-structure and equipment in such nine, and increasing 
health and safety dangers on the occasion of the mine's 
reopening, and will cause irreparable injury due to the loss of 
an experienced and well-trained work force familiar with the 
mine, and will increase the risk to the mine workers upon a 
'reopening of the mine with different personnel• The nine 
employees will also suffer immediate and direct irreparable 
injury, 
71. Trail Mountain is entitled to a preliminary and 
permanent injunction requiring UPC to commence immediately and 
continue purchasing Trail Mountain coal in accordance with the 
Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require &PC to inform 
immediately and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay for 
Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract and the ARCO/NPC Contract. 
WHEREFORE, Trail Mountain prays for judgment against 
NPC and ARCO as follows: 
A. For a preliminary and permanent injunction 
requiring NPC to commence immediately and continue acceptance 
of and make payment for Trail Mountain coal in accordance with 
the Trail Mountain/NPC Contract, and to require m?C to 
immediately inforn and instruct ARCO to accept delivery and pay 
for Trail Mountain coal pursuant to the Trail Mountain/ARCO 
Contract and for NPC to accept delivery and pay for Trail 
Mountain coal.as blended under the ARCO/NPC Contract, 
B . For a money judgment against BPC in an amount of 
not less than Forty-six Million Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($46,250,000.00)* 
C* For a money judgment against ARCO in an amount of 
not less than Twenty-seven Million Seve)i Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($27,750,000.00). 
D. For interest on the amount of all damages at the 
legal rate from the date of NPC's and ARCO's suspension of 
C3'd 1H101 
acceptance of Trail Mountain coal through judgment and at the 
judgment rate from the date of judgment until paid, 
D. For all costs of this action. 
E. For such other and further relief as the Court 
deems just and equitable. 
DATED this ffi^ day of March, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK, & MCDONOUGH 
Randall N.~ Skanchy >c
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address* 
1200 First Security Plasa 
Lexington, Kentucky 40507 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a, 
California corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v s . ] 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
vs. ] 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK COAL COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK COAL SALES ] 
CORPORATION, a Delaware corpora-] 
tion, NATOMAS COAL COMPANY, a ] 
California corporation and ] 
W.K. MINERALS, a California ] 
corporation, ] 
Additional Counter- ] 
claim Defendants. ] 
l AMENDED ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
' AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND AMENDED 
1 COUNTERCLAIM OF NEVADA POWER 
1
 COMPANY 
\ Civil No. C-84-0686G 
i Judge J. Thomas Greene 
COMES NOW Nevada Power Company and moves to dismiss the 
Amended Complaint for its failure to state a claim against this 
defendant upon which relief can be granted/ upon the following 
grounds: 
(a) The plaintiff. Trail Mountain Coal Company, a California 
corporation, was organized in 1981 first by Natomas Coal Company 
and thereafter by Diamond Shamrock to act as an operating agent 
for the Trail Mountain mine first of Natomas Coal Company and 
thereafter of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, who the real parties 
in interest, and for the further reason that the operation and 
ownership of the mine in question is under the con.trol and direc-
tion of Natomas Coal Company and Diamond Shamrock Coal Company 
which, under the provisions of Rule 17(a), should be the real par-
ties in interest in this action. 
(b) Under Counts V, VI, and VII, plaintiff seeks damages 
either directly against Arco or as a third-party beneficiary under 
a Nevada Power Company/Swisher Coal Company Contract, Exhibit B, 
when under the law and under the provisions of the applicable 
contracts, Exhibits A, B, & C. Plaintiff is not a third-party 
beneficiary and its claim, if any, is against Swisher Coal Com-
pany and not against this defendant. 
(c) The Amended Complaint is seeking specific performance 
under both a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction and 
fails to state relief justifying injunctive relief in the follow-
ing particulars: 
(i) There is no allegation of an inadequate remedy at 
law, but to the contrary, the Amended Complaint claims ascer-
tainable damages for breach of contract. 
(ii) There are no allegations of an immediate irrepar-
able injury. Instead, the claim is only for future and 
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clearly speculative events/ rather than immediate causal fac-
tors. 
(iii) There are no allegations showing the probability 
of success on the merits. 
(iv) The public policy and irreparable injury allega-
tions of paragraphs 27 and 62 are either immaterial to the 
injunction proceeding or are clearly eliminated by Trail 
Mountain's compliance with existing mining statutes and regu-
lations set forth under 30 C.F.R. 75.1171-1/ 75.1171-3/ 
75.325 and 30 C.F.R. 75.330. 
(v) There are no allegations that the relative hard-
ship to the defendant/ notwithstanding the bond/ is less than 
on the plaintiff. 
(d) The action claiming modification of the contract and 
waiver of quality requirements is barred by the provisions of 
U.C.A. 70A-2-612 and further by Section 13 of the contract/ 
Exhibit A to the Complaint/ which provides inter alia/ that the 
failure of either party to insist upon strict performance shall 
not be construed as a waiver of such provisions/ but such provi-
sions shall continue in full force and effect. 
(e) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted in that it fails to allege 
that the alleged modified Contract has any specific or necessary 
terms either expressed or implied/ and thus the allegations are 
deficient as a matter of law; in that the allegations concerning 
modification and waiver do not state a cause of action/ and there 
are no allegations to show privity in the plaintiff and thus a 
right to sue on the Contract. 
The use of the term "Trail Mountain" in this Amended Answer 
and Amended Counterclaim* unless otherwise designated as "Trail 
Mountain Utah/" for purposes of simplifying the terminology shall 
be deemed to refer to Natomas Coal Company, Diamond Shamrock Coal 
Company, as the owner, operator, and principle responsible entity 
for the Trail Mountain Mine, Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corpor-
ation and to Plaintiff as the agent, operator and alter ego of the 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Company and Shamrock Coal Sales Corpor-
ation 
FIRST DEFENSE 
in response to the specific allegations of Plaintiff's Amen-
ded Complaint, Nevada Power admits, denies and alleges as fol-
lows: 
I. 
DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES; JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Denies the allegations of paragraph 1, but admits that 
Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah; and alleges affirmatively 
that the Trail Mountain Coal Mine is owned and operated by the 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, through its agent and employees in 
Trail Mountain Coal company, plaintiff. 
2. Admits the allegations of paragraph 2. 
3. Admits the allegations of paragraph 3. 
as the agents operator and alter ego of the Diamond Shamrock Coal 
Company and Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation. 
Defendant Nevada Power Company ("Nevada Power") answers 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted in that it fails to allege that the 
alleged modified Contract has any specific or necessary terms 
either expressed or implied/ and thus the allegations are defi-
cient as a matter of law, and also in that the allegations con-
cerning modification and waiver do not state a cause of action. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
In response to the specific allegations of Plaintiff's 
Complaint/ Nevada Power pleads as follows: 
I. 
DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES: JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Denies the allegations of paragraph 1/ but admits that 
Trail Mountain Coal Company is a California corporation qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah; and alleges affirmatively 
that the Trail Mountain Coal Mine is owned and operated by the 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Company/ through its agent and employees in 
Trail Mountain Coal company/ plaintiff. 
2. Admits the allegations of paragraph 2. 
3. Admits the allegations of paragraph 3. 
4e Denies the allegations of paragraph 4 because of insuf-
ficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth 
thereof. 
5c Denies the allegations of paragraph 5 because of insuf~ 
ficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth 
thereof, 
6. Admits that the referenced contracts are to be per-
formed in the State of Utah but denies that Plaintiff is a party 
to those contractSe 
7c Denies the allegations of paragraph 7. 
8. Denies the allegations of paragraph 8/ but admits that 
the Nevada Power Company/Trail Mountain Utah Contract/ Exhibit A, 
so provides* 
9o Denies the allegations of paragraph 9 because of insuf-
ficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth 
thereof. 
10. Denies the allegations of paragraph 10 because of 
insufficient information upon which to form a belief as to the 
truth thereof. 
11. Admits the allegations of paragraph 11. 
II. 
FACTS 
12. Denies the allegations of paragraph 12/ but alleges 
that on or about March 1/ 1980, defendant entered into a Coal 
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Sales Agreement with the Trail Mountain Coal Company, a Utah cor-
poration/ a true copy of which is attached to the Complaint as 
Exhibit "A", but alleges further that said Agreement was modified 
by an Amendment thereto also dated March 1, 1980 which has not 
been attached to the Exhibit "A". Nevada Power affirmativly 
alleges that Plaintiff is not the Company which executed the Coal 
Sales Agreement/ but that said Utah corporation has been liquida-
ted/ its assets and liabilities having been distributed to enti-
ties other than plaintiff/ the true identities which have not yet 
been determined. 
13. Admits that Trail Mountain Coal Company/ the Utah cor-
poration ("Trail Mountain Utah") agreed to sell and Nevada agreed 
to purchase specified tonnages of coal per year for the term of 
the contract; admits that for the year 1983 and subsequent years 
and under certain conditions the quantity could be reduced to 
200/000 tons per year at the election of NPC; alleges that under 
Section 3 of the Contract/ the quantities were reduced to 200,000 
tons and to 100/000 by agreement tons in particular years; and 
denies all other allegations of paragraph 13. Defendant alleges 
affirmatively that the coal had to meet certain specific sodium 
requirements and certain specific ash fusion temperature require-
ments/ and that Nevada Power had the right under the contract to 
suspend further delivery and purchase of coal which did not meet 
such requirements on any two consecutive deliveries. Said provi-
sion also/ in substance/ provides that the contract could be term-
inated for cause. Absent justifiable cause/ the term of the con-
tract was indefinite, but could be terminated for other than cause 
at any time after December 31/ 1994/ upon two years prior written 
notice by either party. 
14^ Admits the allegations of paragraph 14/ but alleges 
affirmatively that the contract also required a minimum temper-
ature of 2#200 degrees Fahrenheit for ash fusion* 
15* Admits that Swisher Coal Company/ a wholly owned subsid-
iary of Atlantic Richfield Company/ referred to as ARCO/ and 
defendant entered into a Coal Supply Agreement dated as of 
March 1/ 1980, that a true and correct copy of the original con-
tract before modifications is attached as Exhibit B, and alleges 
that there were amendments to said contract which have not been 
attached to Exhibit B. 
16. Denies the allegations of paragraph 16/ but admits the 
quantities to be purchased as alleged. 
17. Denies the allegations of paragraph 17 and alleges 
affirmatively that the claimed Exhibit C appears in fact to have 
been executed in part by a corporation designated as the Fetterolf 
Group/ Inc./ rather than by plaintiff/ and the Fetterolf Group 
would be a proper and necessary plaintiff herein since there are 
no allegations of privity between the original parties to the 
Contract and the plaintiff. 
18. Alleges that the contract speaks for itself. 
19. Denies the allegations of paragraph 19/ and alleges as 
follows: The Trail Mountain Utah represented to Nevada Power 
prior to execution of the Coal Sales Agreement that the coal would 
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meet the maximum of 3 percent sodium content in its ash and said 
term was thereupon agreed to and placed in the contract. Most of 
the Trail Mountain coal shipments have consisted of coal with more 
than the maximum percentage of 3 percent sodium in the ash. Trail 
Mountain knew or reasonably should have known that the coal did 
not meet 3 percent sodium requirement but/ nevertheless/ at no 
time informed Nevada Power that said coal did not meet said 
requirement. From time to time the Trail Mountain coal had var-
ious deficiencies in it which caused operating problems and which 
deficiencies were contrary to the quality specifications set forth 
in the contract and Nevada Power. In August/ 1981/ a coal anal-
ysis showed Nevada POwer that one shipment supposedly of Trail 
Mountain Coal did not meet the 3 percent maximum sodium percentage 
requirement and so informed Trail Mountain Utah. However/ Trail 
Mountain throughout the contract/ continued to assure Nevada Power 
that Trail Mountain Mine coal did meet all the requirments under 
the contract. In late 1983 Nevada Power had increasingly exces-
sive shutdowns because of "slagging" and or "fouling" in its boil-
ers and questioned ARCO concerning its coal supply. Thereafter in 
order to attempt to isolate the cause of the increasing slagging/ 
Nevada Power undertook tests in early March/ 1984/ of the five 
consecutive shipments made by Trail Mountain in January/ February/ 
and March/ 1984. Said tests showed that all five train loads 
exceeded the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide ash content. Immedi-
ately upon learning for the first time that the Trail Mountain 
coal in at least two consecutive shipments was contained higher 
sodium content in the ash than the contract permitted, Nevada 
Power notified Trail Mountain and plaintiff at a meeting on March 
19/ 1984, followed by a letter on March 20/ 1984/ that the coal 
shipments would have to be suspended under the Contract provisions 
until the coal could be upgraded to meet the contract requirements 
on sodium content and ash fusion temperatures. Since 1980 defen-
dant was purchasing Trail Mountain coal along with coal from sev-
eral other suppliers for use at the defendant's Reid-Gardner Plant 
in Nevada/ and thus the specific cause of prior slagging was not 
isolated until the March testing/ at which time it was determined 
by Nevada Power that the Trail Mountain Mine coal in two consecu-
tive shipments did not meet the contract quality specification. 
20* Denies the allegations of paragraph 20 and alleges that 
Nevada Power Company continually complained to Trail Mountain 
about the quality of the Trail Mountain coal and continually 
received assurances over these years that the coal was meeting all 
requirements under the contract. 
21« With regard to the allegations of paragraph 21/ admits 
that Nevada Power requested of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company that 
the annual shipments of coal for calender year 1983 be reduced in 
accordance with and as permitted by the Contract and affirmatively 
alleges that Diamond Shamrock Coal Company complied with that 
request. 
22* Denies the allegations of paragraph 22/ and alleges that 
a proposal to reduce coal shipments by 15 percent was made to all 
of the eight Nevada Power coal suppliers/ some of whom voluntarily 
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agreed to the reduction and some of whom/ including Trail 
Mountain^ did not so agree. Nevada Power asked for this 15 per-
cent reduction because of a substantial drop in the anticipated 
electric load required of Nevada Power to serve its many custo-
mers. 
23. Denies the allegations of paragraph 23/ and alleges that 
Trail Mountain responded to the letter suggesting the reduction by 
unreasonably requesting an increase of the contract minimum to 
500/000 tons of coal. Upon receipt of this unreasonable request/ 
Nevada Power simply did not pursue the matter further and left it 
up to Trail Mountain whether or not it would voluntarily reduce 
its sale by 15 percent and Trail Mountain elected not to do so. 
Thus/ the matter was dropped. 
24. Denies the allegations of paragraph 24 as alleged in the 
Amended Complaint and affirmatively alleges and admits that there 
had been several complaints throughout the years concerning coal 
quality which complaints were both in writing and oral. Admits 
that in approximately 1983 Nevada Power informed Diamond Shamrock 
Coal Company that its coal might not comply with the sodium oxide 
specification; admits that on March 20/ 1984/ Nevada Power 
informed Diamond Shamrock Coal Company by letter that further 
shipments of such coal would be suspended unless and until the 
sodium oxide specification was met. Defendant further alleges 
that it was not until December 1983/ that slagging and fouling 
became so consistent that the testing of the specific Trail Moun-
tain Mine train loads delivered during January/ February/ and 
March of 1984 became absolutely necessary to determine the quality 
of the coal that it was determined that Trail Mountain Mine coal 
was causing the slagging and shutdown of units of the defendant's 
Reid-Gardner Plant, upon which test results the March 20, 1984, 
letter was based. Prior to the isolation of the said train loads, 
it was impractical and unreasonable for Nevada Power to determine 
with any certainty that the Trail Mountain Mine coal was consis-
tently causing slagging and foulinge 
25. Denies the allegations of paragraph 25, but alleges that 
on or about May 10, 1984, ARCO suspended shipments c5f coal from 
the Trail Mountain Mine and notified defendant of said suspen-
sion. 
26. Denies the allegations of paragraph 26, and alleges that 
Trail Mountain refused to provide coal that would meet the sodium 
oxide content and refused to take any steps to provide a practical 
and reasonable solution to its deficient coal: and alleges further 
that in April, 1984, Trail Mountain procured the testing of its 
coal by Norwest Company, who concluded that none of the Trail 
Mountain coal could meet the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide 
requirement. 
27. Denies the allegations of paragraph 27 and alleges that 
the only condition that was communicated to Trail Mountain and 
Diamond Shamrock was that the coal meet the contract specifica-
tions: and defendant specifically denies that the conditions that 
"perfect blending" was a requisite, or $1,000 was requested per 
day for damages, or that there would be a reduction in coal price, 
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or that there was a guaranty that the blended coal would not 
adversely affect operations of the Reid-Gardner units were ever 
required* The response to Diamond Shamrock's offer is evidenced 
by a letter dated July 23/ 1984. 
28. Denies the allegations of paragraph 28/ but alleges that 
on March 20/ 1984# by letter defendant informed Trail Mountain 
that the test results showed that all of the coal deliveries 
failed to meet the sodium test/ and informed Trail Mountain that 
the coal purchases would be suspended in accordance with the con-
tract provisions until the contract specifications could be met. 
Plaintiff thereupon confirmed through its own test that the coal 
would not meet the specification. No effort was made by Diamond 
Shamrock to remedy the defective coal and on April 27/ 1984/ 
Diamond Shamrock was again notified by letter that unless evidence 
was furnished that the coal mixture would meet the quality speci-
fications of the agreement by August 1/ 1984/ Nevada Power would 
consider the agreement to be cancelled. Said notice was a reason-
able notice and in accordance with Section 4.3 of the agreement 
between the parties/ and Trail Mountain did not furnish or attempt 
to furnish such evidence. 
29. Denies the allegations of paragraph 29 and alleges 
affirmatively that Plaintiff is not a party to the contract/ that 
all of the alleged money damages are speculative and without sub-
stance and alleges further that Trail Mountain has failed and 
refused to mitigate any alleged losses by refusing to correct the 
deficient coal supply and by failing and refusing to find other 
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purchasers for said coal* Defendant alleges that the claimed dam-
ages are not the result of any breach of contract/ but are specu-
lative and without foundation* 
30. Denies the allegations of paragraph 30* 
31. Denies the allegations of paragraph 31/ and alleges that 
the claimed "irreparable injuries" are not irreparable/ that the 
alleged difficulties are properly resolved and eliminated if the 
plaintiff complies with the applicable Federal Coal Regulations/ 
including/ but not limited to the provisions of 30 C.F.R. 
75.1171-1# 75.1171-3/ 30 C.P.R. 75e325 and 30 C.P.R. 75.330. 
III. 
CAUSES OF ACTION 
Count I 
32. Defendant realleges and incorporates herein the admis-
sions/ denials and allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 
31 above. 
33. Denies the allegations of paragraph 33 for the reason 
that it merely calls for a legal opinion/ and for the reason/ that 
the terms of the contract are very specific in ennunciating the 
responsibilities of the parties. 
34. Denies the allegations of paragraph 34. Defendant 
alleges that plaintiff/ itself/ in the allegations of this 
Amended Complaint and through the testing it undertook with 
Norwest Testing Laboratory admits that the Trail Mountain coal 
does not meet the sodium oxide content requirement of the con-
tract and in some instances does not meet the ash fusion temper-
ature requirement of the Contract/ and the sodium quality and ash 
fusion temperature contract requirements are material/ essential 
and substantial elements of the Contract/ the failure to adhere 
thereto being substantial breaches of the Contract/ which impair 
the value and usefulness of the coal; and further alleges affirma-
tively that the burning of the Trail Mountain coal which exceeds 
the 3 percent sodium oxide maximum causes "slagging" and "fouling" 
and has resulted in the shutdown of boilers of the Reid-Gardner 
plant on several different occasions causing the defendant to 
incur additional costs over and above those ordinarily incurred in 
the operation of the boiler/ of in excess of $64/000 per day per 
boiler/ added repair and maintenance costs and a reduction in 
plant efficiency. The failure of the coal to meet the aforesaid 
quality requirements reasonably caused defendant sufficient appre-
hension as to the probable injurious effect on its boilers as to 
justify requiring plaintiff to bring the coal back into the com-
pliance with the contract quality requirements. 
35. Denies the allegations of paragraph 35 and alleges that 
Trail Mountain by failing and refusing to comply with the contract 
specifications after reasonable and proper notice to so comply/ 
materially breached the contract by refusing to furnish coal in 
accordance with the contract specifications/ thus entitling the 
defendant to suspend shipments thereof and to thereafter terminate 
the contract in accordance with paragraph 4.3. 
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Count II 
36* Defendant incorporates herein and realleges the admis-
sions, denials and allegations contained in its answers 1 through 
35 above* 
37. Denies the allegations of paragraph 37 and alleges that 
at such time as the defendant first was able to segregate the 
Trail Mountain coal from the other seven suppliers of coal and 
determine through testing that the Trail Mountain coal was defi-
cient in its sodium oxide requirement/ defendant immediately noti-
fied plaintiff of such deficiency and requested that the plaintiff 
comply with the terms of the contract/ all as is required and per-
mitted under the terms of the contract; and alleges further that 
from the inception of the contract in 1980/ Trail Mountain/ the 
owner and operator knew; but failed to inform defendant of the 
fact that its coal did not meet this contract quality specifica-
tion. Natomas Coal Company/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corpora-
tion/ and Diamond Shamrock Coal Company/ being experts in coal 
quality analysis/ having warranted in the contract that the coal 
would meet the sodium and ash fusion quality requirements/ and 
knowing that Nevada Power was not expert in such coal analysis, 
nevertheless failed to take or having taken/ failed to notify 
Nevada Power of various coal analysis which would have alerted 
Nevada Power as to the probability of damage to the defendant's 
boilers and would have resulted in Nevada Power taking protective 
steps to suspend shipments of coal earlier than it did. Nevada 
Power relied upon the representations of plaintiff and successors 
as to coal quality* 
38. Denies the allegations of paragraph 38 and alleges that 
defendant merely offered to the plaintiff the opportunity of redu-
cing the coal shipments by 15 percent/ which offer was refused by 
the plaintiff/ at which time the plaintiff unreasonably requested 
an increase in the total annual contract tonnage of coal from 
200/000 to 500/000 tons; and as a result/ no agreement resulted 
from the actions of the parties. Defendant further alleges that 
Nevada Power made the same offer to seven other coal suppliers/ 
some of whom accepted the same and others of which rejected said 
offer. The matter with plaintiff was thereupon dropped. 
39. Denies the allegations of paragraph 39 and alleges that 
defendant has always been ready/ willing and able to continue to 
purchase the coal from Trail Mountain under the contract/ either 
that coal which Trail Mountain has in its own mines or which it 
could/ under the provisions of the contract/ obtain elsewhere/ 
provided that said coal met the contract specifications/ which 
specifications and the coal quality required thereunder were 
reasonable and necessary for the proper operation of the defen-
dants Reid-Gardner Plant. Defendant at no time used subterfuge 
or in any other way attempted to eliminate coal shipments by Trail 
Mountain or anyone else under the contract. 
40. Denies the allegations of paragraph 40. 
Count III 
41. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges the allega-
tions/ admissions and denials contained in its answer under para-
graphs 1 through 40 above. 
42. Denies the allegations of paragraph 42# and alleges that 
both by the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code and by the provi-
sions of paragraph 13 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract/ 
plaintifffs claim for contract modification is barred. 
43. Denies the allegations of paragraph 43; and alleges that 
the paragraph is indefinite/ establishes no specific terms either 
as to coal quality or other contract provisions and alleges that 
plaintifffs knowledge as to the sodium characteristics or its 
intent to claim a variation in the contract was only determined in 
April 1984. In fact/ the sodium quality of the Trail Mountain 
coal is so inconsistent that no pattern was established between 
1980 and 1984 and/ in fact/ varied from 1.78 percent to 6.02 per-
cent/ with 11 out of 29 being 3.45 percent or less/ and ash fusion 
temperature varying from 2100 to 2500 with 10 out of 23 being 2200 
or higher. 
44. Denies the allegations of paragraph 44/ and alleges that 
Nevada Power at no time refused to accept any Trail Mountain coal 
that complied with the contract requirements/ and alleges that 
Trail Mountain failed and refused to take any reasonable steps to 
correct its deficient coal and instead suggested impossible condi-
tions with its alleged offer to combine coal by alternating 
trucks. Defendant further alleges that plaintiff failed to take 
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any of the steps which were available and which would have elimi-
nated the problem/ thus mitigating any losses completely/ and rea-
sonably refused to attempt to bring its coal to specification/ by 
blending/ by mixing or by any other methods. 
Count IV 
45c Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations/ admissions and denials set forth in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 44 above. 
46. Denies the allegations of paragraph 46/ and alleges that 
even if there had been acquiescence and acceptance/ which is 
denied by defendant/ but which has been alleged by plaintiff/ said 
acquiescence and acceptance does not modify the contract and does 
not lessen or eliminate any of the terms of the contract as is 
specifically provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code and 
under paragraph 13 of the contract. 
47. Denies the allegations of paragraph 47/ and alleges that 
Trail Mountain knew from that its coal from time to time was defi-
cient/ but failed to so inform Nevada Power/ and instead continu-
ously assured Nevada Power that its coal met the specifications/ 
knowing that Nevada Power had no expertise in coal analysis/ and 
failed to take any steps to correct the coal delivered to defen-
dant. Defendant alleges that Trail Mountain voluntarily/ at their 
own election and without any reliance upon the actions/ inactions/ 
or alleged waiver by Nevada Power/ did continue to operate/ did 
seek and obtain other coal contracts/ and did not close the mine. 
48. Denies the allegations of paragraph 48. 
COUNT V 
49e Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations/ admissions and denials set forth in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 48 above/ and alleges that since this 
Count V is directed solely against Arco/ this defendant need not 
respond. 
50. Denies the allegations of paragraph 50/ for the reason 
that the contract speaks for itself and needs no legal conclusion 
as to whether it is or is not an "installment contract". 
51. Denies the allegations of paragraph 51 as beyond the 
issues to which this defendant must respond and because of insuf-
ficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth 
thereof. 
52. Denies the allegations of paragraph 52 as beyond the 
issues to which this defendant must respond and because of insuf-
ficient information upon which to form a belief as to the truth 
thereof. 
COUNT VI 
53. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations/ admissions and denials contained in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 52 above. 
54. Denies the allegations of paragraph 54. 
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55. Denies the allegations of paragraph 55, and alleges 
affirmatively that Trail Mountain is neither an intended nor an 
incidental third-party beneficiary of such contract. 
56. Denies the allegations of paragraph 56/ and alleges that 
the Trail Mountain coal was reasonably determined by Nevada Power 
not to comply with the coal quality requirements of the Nevada 
Power/Swisher Contract. 
57. Denies the allegations of paragraph 57/ and alleges that 
at no time did Nevada Power ever refuse to accept coal blended 
with ARCO coal if such coal met the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power 
quality specifications and the Nevada Power/Swisher contract 
quality requirements/ and any claim for breach of contract or 
damages resulting therefrom is only applicable to the contract 
between the plaintiff and ARCO, and should therefore be dis-
missed. 
Count VII 
58. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations/ admissions and denials contained in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 57 above. 
59. Admits the allegations of paragraph 59 insofar as it 
relates to the Coal Supply Agreement/ Exhibit Ct attached to the 
Complaint/ but alleges that said contract speaks for itself and 
alleges further that in substance the contract has not been 
assigned by the Fetterolf Group/ Inc. 
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60* Denies the allegations of paragraph 60 as stated/ but 
alleges that Trail Mountain Coal/ if it meets the coal quality 
requirements reasonably required by Nevada Power# could be satis-
factory for said use. 
61* Denies the allegations of paragraph 61/ and alleges fur-
ther that under the Uniform Commercial Code of Utah and under the 
provisions of the contract/ the Agreement has not been amended/ 
nor have the quality requirements in any way been modified or 
reduced from those set forth in the original contract* 
62. Denies the allegations of paragraph 62. 
63. Denies the allegations of paragraph 63/ and alleges that 
Nevada Power has the right under its contract to not accept coal 
which does not meet the specification requirements set forth in 
the Trail Mountain/Nevada Power Contract/ i.e./ a maximum of 3 
percent sodium oxide and a minimum of 2/200 degrees Fahrenheit 
ash fusion temperature/ or which does not meet the requirements of 
the Nevada Power/Arco Contract. 
Count VIII 
64. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations/ admissions and denials contained in its answer 
under paragraphs 1 through 63 above. 
65. Admits that paragraph 2.2 of the contract provides that 
substitute coal may be provided to NPC subject to NPCfs approval/ 
which approval will not be unreasonably withheld/ but alleges that 
the said paragraph 2.2 also provides that such substitute coal 
shall be subject to all other terms and conditions of this agree-
ment; and that Trail Mountain/ in proposing to supply a mix of its 
coal and another suppliers coal/ failed and refused to agree that 
said coal should comply with the quality specifications governing 
sodium oxide content and ash fusion temperatures/ which provisions 
are some of the "other terms and conditions of this agreement"; 
and that defendant has not unreasonably withheld any approval 
because the plaintiff has not offered to supply such coal in 
accordance with the contract conditions/ and denies all other 
allegations of paragraph 65. 
66. Admits that Trail Mountain offered a substitute mixture 
of its coal and another supplier's coal/ but denies all other 
allegations of paragraph 66/ and specifically denies that such an 
offer was made in good faith because Trail Mountain knew its coal 
could not comply with the specification/ also refused to have said 
coal comply with the contract specifications and proposed an 
unreasonable and unworkable method of attempting to mix said coals 
and without authority of the proposed "other supplier". Defendant 
further alleges that said offer to substitute coal was made within 
just a few days prior to the termination date set by the defendant 
as August 1/ 1984/ without any attempt to satisfy defendant that 
said coal could meet the specifications; and that prior thereto in 
April/ 1984/ plaintiff's own testing laboratory had determined 
that plaintiff's coal could not meet the contract specifications. 
67. Denies the allegations of paragraph 67 and alleges that 
the only condition indicated by the defendant was that the coal 
would have to meet the contract requirements/ and that such a con-
dition was reasonable and in accordance with the contract/ was 
workable since plaintiff could have properly mixed such coal with 
proper blending to come up with a substitute coal/ was not burden-
some in that the relative cost to be employed by the plaintiff to 
accomplish a coal which met specification was readily available to 
the plaintiff/ and that said condition was in no way oppressive/ 
in that the plaintiff could easily and readily have undertaken the 
steps to make the coal comply with the specification/ but unrea-
sonably refused to do so. 
68. Denies the allegations of paragraph 68 and alleges fur-
ther that defendant has at all times been ready/ willing and able 
to continue the contract performance with the plaintiff/ had the 
plaintiff furnished coal to meet the contract specifications/ and 
alleges further that Trail Mountain has failed and refused to 
mitigate its claimed damages/ either by effectively blending the 
coal or by seeking other purchasers/ both of which remedies have 
been and are readily available. 
Count IX 
69. Defendant incorporates herein and realleges by reference 
the allegations/ admissions and denials hereinabove set forth in 
its answer under paragraphs 1 through 68 above. 
70. Denies the allegations of paragraph 70# and alleges that 
these allegations have been specifically and generally denied 
heretofore and to the extent that they have not/ defendant herein 
denies specifically and generally all allegations of this para-
graph 70. 
71. Denies the allegations of paragraph 71, and alleges that 
the plaintiff has neither alleged a cause of action for a prelim-
inary or a permanent injunction, has admitted that it breached the 
contract, and has so breached since the inception of the contract 
by refusing to furnish coal meeting the contract specification. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. Nevada Power constructed the Reid-Gardner Plant in four 
different generating boilers, the order of construction and plac-
ing said boilers on line for generation was as follows: 
No. 1 boiler: Placed on line June 30, 1965; 
No. 2 boiler: Placed on line June 1, 1968; 
No. 3 boiler: Placed on line May 30, 1976; and 
No. 4 boiler: Placed on line July 26, 1983. 
Boilers 1, 2, and 3 have particular specifications requiring that 
coal used in the firing of said boilers would have a maximum of 3 
percent sodium oxide in the ash and would require a minimum ash 
fusion temperature of 2,200 degrees Fahrenheit, along with other 
specific requirements. The Trail Mountain coal was purchased 
specifically for use in boilers 1, 2, and 3. Separate coal con-
tracts were entered into with other suppliers to furnish coal for 
Boiler Unit No. 4. Nevada Power is unable to use coal in Units 1, 
2, and 3 which does not meet the above specifications. 
2. Trail Mountain Utah and its agents were informed? during 
negotiations and prior to execution of the Coal Sales Contract of 
the fact that Nevada Power's Raid Gardner Generating Plants, boil-
ers 1, 2, and 3 were constructed in such a way that they should 
only be operated with coal having 3 percent or less sodium oxide 
content in the ash and having ash fusion minimum temperatures of 
2*200 degrees Fahrenheit* Trail Mountain Utah represented to 
defendant in its written proposal to defendant prior to execution 
of the Coal Sales Agreement that its coal from the Trail Mountain 
mine met those specifications, and based upon these representa-
tions, defendant entered into the Coal Sale Agreement, Exhibit A, 
attached to the Complaint, in which said specifications were 
included, 
3, During the contract negotiation Trail Mountain Utah knew 
from at least one coal analysis that its coal would not meet the 
specification, and after execution of the said contract and con-
tinuing thereafter to the present time, plaintiff Trail Mountain 
Utah and then Trail Mountain had ordered and received several coal 
analysis reports, some of which showed that the coal did not meet 
the contract specifications concerning sodium oxide maximum per-
centages and ash fusion minimum temperatures. 
4# During performance of the contract, the defendant had 
continuous difficulty in maintaining its boilers, which difficulty 
was caused in part by the Trail Mountain coal. However, through 
regular ASTM testing, and notwithstanding complaints to Trail 
Mountain, defendant was unable to determine the exact cause for 
the slagging and the continued operational problems in the boil-
ers. Notwithstanding these complaints/ the plaintiff continued to 
assure defendant that the coal met all contract specification 
requirements. 
5. In December/ 1983/ defendant encountered more serious 
and continuous outages than had occurred over the past years in 
its boiler operations/ and conducted a thorough investigation and 
independent testing program to attempt to isolate the coal causing 
the problem and to isolate the problem. Said testing involved the 
samples from five consecutive shipments taken from the Trail Moun-
tain mine during the months of January/ February and one sample in 
early March of 1984. From these tests it was concluded in March/ 
1984/ that Trail Mountain coal was substantially exceeding the 
sodium oxide maximum requirement of 3 percent and that this defi-
ciency was jeopardizing the operation of boilers 1/ 2, and 3 in 
the Reid-Gardner plant. 
6. On March 19/ 1984/ immediately after making such deter-
mination/ defendant/ at a conference with Trail Mountain represen-
tatives/ and again on March 20/ 1984/ by a letter attached as 
Exhibit 1 to the original Answer filed herein/ suspended further 
Trail Mountain deliveries of coal until it was shown that Trail 
Mountain coal met the specifications. 
7. Thereafter/ on April 16/ 1984/ Trail Mountain conducted 
its own independent testing of the coal and said tests showed that 
the Trail Mountain coal could not meet the sodium oxide specifica-
tions under the contract. 
8C On April 27, 1984, after receiving the Trail Mountain 
test and because of the immediate urgency in keeping the plant in 
operation, Nevada Power gave written notice, in accordance with 
paragraph 4C3 of the contract, that Trail Mountain had until 
August 1, 1984, to show that the coal it was selling would meet 
the specification* See Exhibit 2 attached to original Complaint* 
9* On July 18, 1984, Trail Mountain offered to mix its coal 
with the higher grade of coal to be obtained from Tower Resources, 
another coal supplier in the area, which had a low sodium content, 
and proposed to do this by simply alternating truck loads from the 
Trail Mountain mine and from the Tower Resources mine. Such a 
proposal was obviously unworkable for many reasons and did not 
show or attempt to show that the coal would meet the specifica-
tion, and on July 23, 1984, Nevada Power responded to the offer 
requesting evidence that the coal would meet the specifications, 
and at the same time questioned the practicality of such a mixing 
process using alternate truck loads. At all times since December 
1983, defendant has consistently informed Trail Mountain that the 
only requirement it has is that the coal be supplied in accordance 
with the quality terms of the contract* However, the plaintiff, 
at the same time, by its July 30, 1984 letter, refused to under-
take any more efforts to furnish coal in accordance with the con-
tract or to furnish any proof that its coal would meet the speci-
fication, but to the contrary, maintained that the contract had 
now been modified by its consistent furnishing of subspecification 
materials over the past years, and Trail Mountain thereafter, 
without further effort to mitigate its losses/ or to satisfy the 
contract requirements, commenced this lawsuit. 
10. Paragraph 4.3 of the contract provides that Nevada Power 
shall have the right to suspend further shipments of coal if two 
consecutive shipments of coal do not meet the quality specifica-
tions of paragraph 4.1/ i.e./ the 3 percent maximum sodium oxide 
ash content and the 2/200 minimum ash fusion temperature require-
ments. 
11. Article 13 of the contract provides that the failure of 
either party to insist in any one or more instances upon strict 
performance of any of the provisions of the agreement or take 
advantage of any of its rights hereunder shall not constitute a 
waiver of any such provisions or the relinquishment of any such 
rights/ and such provisions shall continue in full force and 
effect for the term of the agreement. By this paragraph/ the 
Trail Mountain has agreed that/ notwithstanding its delivery of 
subspecification coal/ it nevertheless cannot modify the terms and 
conditions of the contract concerning quality of the coal/ and the 
defendant by the same provisions and under the same circumstances/ 
has the right to continue such provisions in full force and 
effect. The defendant continued in effect the coal quality con-
tract provisions/ and the plaintiff materially breached those 
quality provisions by refusing to furnish the assurance that its 
coal would meet the specifications. 
12. Nevada Power cannot use coal in Units 1/ 2/ and 3 that 
does not meet the sodium and ash fusion specifications. Any such 
use results in slagging and fouling and in the ultimate shutdowr 
of the boiler involved for a period of time while the boilei 
cools, while it is cleaned, and while it gets back into operation/ 
all of which causes substantial extra cost? both in the remedying 
of the problem and in the necessary purchase of supplemental powex 
to be used in lieu of that which otherwise would be generated b^  
such boiler. 
13. Section 70A-2-209(5), U.C.A., provides in substance that 
a party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of 
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notificatior 
that strict performance will be required of any term which has 
been waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a 
material change of position in reliance on the waiver. Thus, it 
is the defendant's position that even if there was any type oi 
waiver as is alleged, the waiver has been retracted by an express 
and reasonable notice to Trail Mountain so indicating; and that at 
the same time there has been no change in position, either alleged 
or claimed by plaintiff in reliance on the waiver. 
14. The claims of waiver and of breach of contract are 
therefore of no avail to the plaintiff and should be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE CONCERNING 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
15. As an affirmative defense to the claim for injunctive 
relief/ defendant realleges paragraphs 1 through 14 under the 
affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim for breach of contract. 
16. Nevada Power is a public utility furnishing electric 
power to Clark County and portions of Nye County/ Nevada/ with 
220/000 consumers taking service from Nevada Power. The total 
generating capacity of Nevada Power is 1600 megawatts/ and the 
actual connected base load to Nevada Power necessary to serve its 
customers is approximately 1300 megawatts. The Reid-Gardner Plant 
generating units 1/ 2, and 3/ supply 330 megawatts of power dedi-
cated to the base load requirements/ which power serves a portion 
of Las Vegas/ Nevada. Reid-Gardner boiler No. 4 generates 250 
megawatts. The consumers of Nevada Power include the large casi-
nos/ such as the MGM Hotel/ which requires 45 megawatts/ about the 
equivalent of the power requirements of the City of St. George/ 
Utah. 
17. All of the power of the Reid-Gardner plant is necessary 
for the complete service to Nevada Power's customers/ and in the 
event that one of the boilers is shut down for a 24-hour period/ 
the power must be purchased from some other source/ and the cost 
of purchase power is approximately $128/000 per day per boiler/ or 
$64/000 per day per boiler/ in excess cost over and above the nor-
mal operating cost for said boiler for said period of time. 
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18. Section 4.2 of the Nevada Power/Trail Mountain Contract 
requires that the buyer shall test each train load by ASTM stan-
dards. Said testing, however, does not include testing for sodium 
oxide content, nor ash fusion minimum temperatures. The A.SeToM. 
tests were carried on by Nevada Power for each of the train loads 
of the Trail Mountain coal as it left the mine yard. Testing for 
sodium and ash fusion cannot be accomplished at the mine yard, but 
can only be performed in a technical time consuming laboratory 
procedure at the Nevada delivery point. Under the contract Nevada 
took title at the Acco siding and therefore could not test for 
sodium and ash fusion until after it had received delivery at its 
plant. Nevada Power thus had to rely upon the Trail Mountain 
representation that the coal met the sodium and ash fusion 
requirement. 
19. Excessive sodium oxide ash content results in "slagging" 
and "fouling" of a boiler and said slagging eventually results in 
a loss of efficiency and eventually in a shutdown of that partic-
ular boiler, resulting in a loss in excess of $64,000 a day during 
the time that the boiler has to cool, has to be cleaned, and 
thereafter put back on the line in service. 
20. The allegations of the Amended Complaint are couched in 
terms of futuristic and speculative loss of profits or the occur-
rence of damages apparently predicated over the full life of a 
contract extending on into the indefinite future. The allegations 
of the Amended Complaint claim clearly that there are ascertain-
able contract damages in the event that Nevada Power breached the 
contract. 
21. Plaintiff's claim based upon irreparable injury shows no 
present danger to its existence or to the public and therefore 
fails as an allegation of the essential element of immediate 
irreparable harm. Said allegation fails to show that there is no 
adequate legal remedy. 
22. In the balancing of relative hardships between the par-
ties/ there is no allegation or claim that the plaintiff will 
immediately suffer any non-compensable hardship. The defendant/ 
on the other hand# if it is forced to accept said coal which does 
not meet the specification requirements/ will be forced to close 
its boilers and suffer for each boiler for each shutdown day the 
cost of purchased power over and above the cost of operating the 
boiler in an amount of $64/000; and that the relative hardships 
are fairly and substantially balanced in favor of the defendant/ 
rather than in favor of the plaintiff. 
23. The policy considerations concerning mine safety or 
affecting the public interest are caused/ if at all/ not by the 
defendant terminating the contract/ but by Trail Mountain's fail-
ure to comply with the various mandatory safety requirements of 
Chapter 30 of the C.F.R./ which governs the methods and procedures 
by which a mine is completely shutdown/ partially shutdown/ or 
continued in partial operation. The speculative hardships to the 
public do not exist/ but for the improper or even negligent fail 
ure of the plaintiff to comply with the procedures to be followed 
under the above regulations. 
24. The final defect in plaintiffes claim in equity is the 
plaintiff's failure to come into an equitable court with clean 
hands. The plaintiff entered into this contract after represent-
ing that its coal would meet the specifications/ but nevertheless * 
knowing that the ccal did not meet the specifications and continu-
ing to maintain that the coal met the specifications when/ in 
fact/ the coal did not. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE TO THE CLAIM RELATIVE 
TO THE ARCO-TRAIL MOUNTAIN CONTRACT 
25* The ARCO-Trail Mountain contract provides that Trail 
Mountain shall sell and ARCO shall purchase 120/000 tons of coal 
per year. The plaintiff/ in asking for an injunction "to require 
Nevada Power to inform immediately and instruct ARCO to accept 
delivery and pay for Trail Mountain coal . . ." requires Nevada 
Power to require specific performance by ARCO of its contract with 
Trail Mountain/ when said direction should properly be to Arco 
under the Amended Complaint. 
WHEREFORE/ defendant prays that the Amended Complaint and 
each of its counts be dismissed with prejudice/ defendant be 
awarded its costs incurred herein and be allowed such other relief 
as may be equitable under the circumstances. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Nevada Power Company counterclaims against Trail Mountain 
Coal Company/ a California corporation/ plaintiff herein/ against 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Company/ a Delaware corporation/ Natomas 
Coal Company/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation/ and Diamond 
Shamrock Corporation/ a Delaware corporation/ which counterclaim 
against additional parties herein is brought by virtue of the 
Order of this Court heretofore entered on the 29th day of March/ 
1985/ and pursuant to Rule 13 H of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Nevada Power Company is a public utility with its prin-
cipal place of business at Las Vegas/ Nevada/ being a Nevada cor-
poration/ serving electric power to approximately 220/000 consum-
ers and consumer connections in Clark County and Nye County/ 
Nevada/ with the principal area of service at Las Vegas/ Nevada. 
Nevada Power is authorized to do business in the State of Utah and 
carries on a limited business in the State of Utah. 
2. Trail Mountain Coal Company/ a California corporation/ 
plaintiff herein/ is the named plaintiff herein with its principal 
office and place of business at Lexington/ Kentucky/ but with a 
mine office situate at the Trail Mountain mine in Utah. 
3. On or about March 1/ 1980/ defendant entered into a Coal 
Sales Agreement with Trail Mountain Coal Company/ a Utah corpor-
ation/ a copy of which agreement is attached to the Complaint 
filed herein as Exhibit A. 
4. In 1981 Natomas Coal Company/ by corporate acquisition, 
obtained all of the outstanding stock and assets of the said Trail 
Mountain Coal Company and the said Trail Mountain Coal Company was 
thereupon liquidated and ceased to do business. By said acquisi-
tion* Natomas Coal Company ostensibly obtained all control, equi-
table and apparent legal interests and ownership in and to all 
assets and liabilities of the said Utah company, including the 
operations of the Trail Mountain mine* In 1981 Natomas Coal Com-
pany established the Trail Mountain Coal Company/ a California 
corporation which is named as plaintiff herein, for the sole pur-
pose of acting as an operating agent of Natomas Coal Company at 
the Trail Mountain mine. 
5. From 1981 to 1983 Natomas Coal Company exercised all 
indecia of legal and equitable ownership, control, rights, and 
interest in and to the Trail Mountain mine and its coal opera-
tions, profits, losses and operating facilities. During said 
period, Natomas employed the mine manager and employees to operate 
said mine for and on behalf of Natomas, and did receive and apply 
for its own use and benefit all income produced from said mine, 
including the payments from Nevada Power and other coal purchasers 
under the subject Coal Sales Agreement and under other Coal Sales 
Agreements entered into with various purchasers for the purchase 
of coal from said mine. 
6. During said period from 1981 to 1983, Natomas fully and 
completely directed the daily operations at the mine, had contin-
uing and effective control and direction of the mining operations, 
received all income from said operations and deposited same in its 
own banking accounts/ paid from said bank accounts all payroll and 
operating expenses/ all accounts payable/ all permit fees and 
other expenses necessary for the operation of said mine; and did 
maintain the principle officers and directors of the Trail Moun-
tain Coal Company Caliornia corporation as the same officers and 
directors as did control the Natomas Coal Company* During said 
period of time the main office/ the main records/ such as pay-
rolls/ accounts payable/ management reports/ were all prepared and 
kept at the office of Natomas Coal Company/ and Natomas did exer-
cise any and all elements of direct management/ control/ supervi-
sion and ownership of the mine and its operations/ and did employ 
the Trail Mountain Coal Company California corporation solely as 
an agent with the limited authority of doing the actual physical 
mining and supervision at the mine. 
7. In September/ 1983/ the Natomas Coal Company was merged 
into the Diamond Shamrock Corporation/ by which merger/ Diamond 
Shamrock Corporation acquired all stock/ assets/ legal and equi-
table ownership and interest in and to the Trail Mountain mine and 
in and to the Trail Mountain Coal Company/ a California corpor-
ation. At said merger/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Company became the 
owner of all stock of the plaintiff herein and did undertake full 
control/ supervision/ ownership/ operational responsibility/ right 
to income/ obligation to pay accounts payable/ payroll and oper-
ating expenses/ and did thereupon assume all indecia of owner 
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ship and did hold itself out to the industry as the owner of the 
Trail Mountain mine and operations* 
8. The Diamond Shamrock Coal Company did continue th€ 
employment of Trail Mountain Coal Company, the California corpor-
ation as its agents to provide operational services at the mine* 
did employ the mine manager and the employees necessary to carr^ 
on the supervision and operation of the mine/ did give direct and 
daily control of the mining operation, did make all decisions con-
cerning operations, suspension of operations, the cessation of 
operations, and the acquisition of coal contracts and purchases 
for said mine through Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation, die 
exercise all control over the sales agreements between Diamond 
Shamrock Coal Company, acting through the Trail Mountain Coal 
Company, California corporation. 
9. During said period of time, beginning in September 1983, 
and continuing on to the present, Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, 
Natomas Coal Company, a subsidiary thereof, Trail Mountain Coal 
Company, the California corporatin, and Diamond Shamrock Coal 
Sales Corporation all had substantially the same officers and 
directors and all of said companies maintained their principal 
places of buiness and offices at 1200 First Security Plaza, 
Lexington, Kentucky, at which offices all of the major corporate 
documents and accounting records for all companies were kept by 
the same office staff and accounting personnel. During said 
period of time, all monies received from coal sales from the Trail 
Mountain mine were placed into Diamond Shamrock Coal Company's 
Dank accounts from which accounts payable/ operating expenses/ 
payrolls/ salaries/ permits/ fees and other expenditures were dis-
bursed at the direction of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company. 
10. From September 1983 to the present time/ all correspon-
dence/ negotiations and other business transactions between Nevada 
Power Company and the Trail Mountain Coal Company/ California cor-
poration/ were carried on and conducted by the Diamond Shamrock 
Coal Company officers and employees. The commencement of the 
subject litigation was authorized/ initiated and directed by 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Company/ acting through its officers in the 
Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales corporation with authority and approv-
al of Diamond Shamrock Coal Company. 
12. The Trail Mountain Coal Company California corporation 
owns no interest/ nor right/ title/ either equitable or legal/ nor 
any contractual rights in and to the Trail Mountain Mine or its 
operation/ or the leases or permits relating thereto/ and all such 
rights and title are owned and held by Diamond Shamrock Coal Com-
pany and/or Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation. 
13. Defendant incorporates and realleges all allegations 
hereinbefore set forth in its Affirmative Defenses. 
First Cause of Action 
14. Nevada Power alleges for its first cause of action and 
incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 13 hereinabove alleged in 
this Counterclaim. 
15e By reason of the aforementioned and alleged facts, 
counterclaim-defendant/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Company as princi-
pal^ owner and operator of the Trail Mountain mine, is doing bus-
iness in the State of Utah, acting by and through its agent. Trail 
Mountain Coal Company, a California corporation, plaintiff herein, 
and as such, is subject to the personal jurisdiction of this 
Court. The said Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, by reason of the 
succession of interest as has been alleged, above, is responsible 
for and has assumed liability for all of the prior actions and 
conduct of the Trail Mountain Coal Company, the California corpor-
ation, and Natomas Coal Company, its immediate predecessor in 
interest, as said liabilities relate to the operation of the Trail 
Mountain mine. 
16. By reason of the breach of the aforesaid Coal Sales 
Contract by Trail Mountain Coal Company, a California corporation, 
by Diamond Shamrock Coal Company, by Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales 
Corporation and by Diamond Shamrock Corporation, Nevada Power 
Company, defendant herein, has been damaged by reason of the shut-
down of elements in the Reid-Gardner Plant by an amount in excess 
of $64,000 per day for every day during which a boiler has been 
shut down as a result of the failure of the said counterclaim 
defendants to furnish the specified coal, and also in an undeter-
mined amount for repairs to the boilers as a result of the burning 
of said defective coal in said boilers; and defendant will be fur-
ther damaged in an amount yet to be determined at trial represent-
ing the difference in price that the defendant may have to pay 
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between the Trail Mountain Coal Sales Contract price and any sub-
stitute coal supplier or substitute power supplier. 
Second Cause of Action 
17. Defendants Nevada Power, realleges paragraphs 1 through 
16 in the first cause of action. 
18. The named plaintiff/ Trail Mountain Coal Company* 
California/ is merely the alter-ego of Diamond Shamrock Coal 
Company and in all matters hereinabove alleged/ Diamond Shamrock 
Coal Company is in fact the true and responsible entity and is 
bound by all acts/ contracts/ and other liabilities of the plain-
tiff as though said acts/ contracts and failures to act are its 
own. 
Third Cause of Action 
19. Defendant realleges paragraphs through 18 of the first 
and second causes of action. 
20. Defendant seeks a declaratory judgment of this Court 
determining that the Coal Sales Agreement between the parties was 
not modified and that it has been properly cancelled and of no 
legal effect pursuant to Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
WHEREFORE/ Defendant prays for judgment against Diamond 
Shamrock Coal Company/ Diamond Shamrock Coal Sales Corporation/ 
Diamond Shamrock Corporation/ Natomas Coal Company and Trail Moun-
tain Coal Company, a California corporation, jointly and several-
ly, in an amount to be determined at trial, but no less than 
$64,000 per day for every day that a unit of the Reid-Gardner 
Plant has been rendered idle or will be rendered idle by the time 
of trial as a result of the breach of the Coal Sales Agreement, 
for a judgment of an amount yet to be determined at trial for the 
costs for undertaking and completing repairs to the boilers and 
for a judgment determining that the Coal Sales Agreement of March 
1# 1980, was not modified, that its quality provisions were in 
effect and that the contract has been properly terminated, and for 
declaratory judgment accordingly* 
DATED this 5th day of June, 1985, 
CYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAH00N 
Nevada Power Company 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Amended Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and 
Amended Counterclaim of Nevada Power Company was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following on the U"^ day of June, 1985; 
William B. Bohling, Esq. 
Kent T. Anderson, Esq. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert A. Peterson, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
APPENDIX 5 
PLAINTIFF TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY'S 
MOTION TO DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD 
COMPANY 
William B. Bohling 
Randall N. Skanchy 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a 
Cali fornia corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, and 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a 
Pennsylvania corporation 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF TRAIL MOUNTAIN 
COAL COMPANY'S MOTION TO 
DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD COMPANY 
Civil No. C-84-0686A 
Plaintiff Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail 
Mountain") by and through its counsel of record, Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, hereby moves this Court for an order 
dropping defendant Atlantic Richfield Company pursuant to Rule 
21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Said Motion is made on the grounds that the addition 
of Atlantic Richfield Company, and the anticipated addition of 
its wholly-owned subsidiary Beaver Creek Coal Company will 
destroy the diversity jurisdiction in this case, 
DATED this \\£ ^~ day of May, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
William B. Bohling ^) 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Trail Mountain Coal Company 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /*^t/. day of May, 1985, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY'S MOTION 
TO DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY to: 
Elliott Lee Pratt, 
Neil A. Kaplan 
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs fit Cahoon 
77 West 200 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert A. Peterson 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Atlantic Richfield Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY 
William B. Bohling 
Randall N. Skanchy 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, and 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a 
Pennsylvania corporation 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC 
RICHFIELD COMPANY 
Civil No. C-84-0686A 
Plaintiff Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail 
Mountain"), by and through its counsel of record, Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, hereby submits the following Memorandum 
in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Drop Defendant Atlantic 
Richfield Company ("Arco"). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On or about March 5, 1985, Calvin Gould, United States 
Magistrate granted plaintiff's Motion for leave to file an 
Amended Complaint and add defendant Arco as a party defendant. 
On or about March 11, 1985, Arco was served with a summons and 
an Amended Complaint. Count V of the Amended Complaint is 
directed against Arco and is based upon breach of contract of 
the Trail Mountain/Arco contract. That contract, a copy of 
which is attacned as Exhibit "B" to the Amended Complaint, was 
by and between Trail Mountain and Swisher Coal Company 
("Swisher"). In Arco8s Motion to Dismiss the Amended 
Complaint, it sets forth the allegations that Beaver Creek Coal 
Company ("Beaver Creek"), as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arco, 
succeeded to the duties and liabilities of Swisher under the 
Trail Mountain/Arco contract, which provides the foundation for 
plaintiff's claim against Arco. (Arco's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities, p* 2*) Thus, Trail Mountain should either 
join Beaver Creek in this action or voluntarily dismiss its 
c^aim against Arco, and pursue Arco and Beaver Creek in a 
separate action. However, the joinder of Beaver Creek, a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 
Utah, would destroy the diversity jurisdiction of this court 
because Trail Mountain, a California corporation, also has its 
principal place of business in Utah. Accordingly, Trail 
Mountain moves this Court to drop Arco as a party to this suit 
in order to maintain diversity jurisdiction and permit this 
Court to proceed with Trail Mountain's claims against Nevada 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that: 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for 
dismissal of an action. Parties may be 
dropped or added by order of the court on 
motion of any party or of its own initiative 
at any stage of the action and on such terms 
aa are just. Any claim against a party may 
be severed and proceeded with separately. 
(Emphasis added) 
Courts frequently employ Rule 21 to preserve diversity 
jurisdiction by dropping a non-diverse party if its presence is 
not indispensable. See, Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal 
Co., 585 F.2d 683 (4th Cir. 1978); Jett v. Phillips & 
Associates, 439 F.2d 987, 990-991 (10th Cir. 1971); 7 Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure; Civil, § 1685, at 332 
(1972). A motion to drop a party under this Rule is addressed 
to the discretion of the court, and the Tenth Circuit has held 
that parties may be dropped "in order to achieve the requisite 
diversity of citizenship." Jett v. Phillips & Associates, 
supra, at 990-991. Only if the party sought to be dropped is 
indispensable within the meaning of Rule 19 may the court not 
make such an order. Id. at 991. 
As noted above, Beaver Creek is a Delaware corporation 
with its alleged principal place of business in Utah* Trail 
Mountain, a California corporation also has its principal place 
of business in Utah. For the purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of the state in which 
it is incorporated and the state wherein it has its principal 
place of businesso See, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). As such, the 
addition of Arco, and the necessary addition of Beaver Creek as 
the successor in interest to the Trail Mountain/Arco agreement 
would destroy the diversity jurisdiction of this Court. 
Neither Arco or Beaver Creek are indispensable parties 
to plaintiff's claims of breach of contract against defendant 
Nevada Power Company. Although the Trail Mountain/Arco 
agreement forms the basis for two of plaintifffs claims against 
Nevada Power, (Count VI for breach of contract as a third party 
beneficiary and Count VII for interference and inducement to 
breach contract), the law is clear that Arco and/or Beaver 
Creek are not indispensaole parties to this action. See, 
Arkansas v.Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953) (in an action for 
inducement to breach a contract the party prevented from 
performing the contract is not an indispensable party); Manning 
v. Wiscombe, 498 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1974) (suit for breach of 
contract may be brought by a third party beneficiary without 
the joinder of all parties to the contract)* As such, this 
court should exercise its discretion to drop Atlantic Richfield 
Company as a party from this lawsuit• 
DATED this /</ &- day of May, 1985. 
JONES, V^ ALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
William B. Bohlmg j) 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Trail Mountain Coal Company 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the )'Jt^ day of May, 1985, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
DROP DEFENDANT ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY to: 
Elliott Lee Pratt, 
Neil A. Kaplan 
Clyde, Pratt, Gibbs & Cahoon 
77 West 200 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Robert Ac Peterson 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Atlantic Richfield Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Pc 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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William B. Bohling 
Randall N. Skanchy 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, and 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a 
Pennsylvania corporation 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C-84-0686G 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED pursuant to Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by Trail Mountain Coal Company 
("Trail Mountain") as plaintiff and Nevada Power Company 
("Nevada Power") as defendant, by and through their counsel, 
that the above-entitled action, including the Amended Complaint 
and Amended Counterclaim on file herein, and all claims made by 
plaintiff Trail Mountain against defendant Nevada Power and 
defendant Nevada Power against plaintiff Trail Mountain, be, 
and hereby are dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear its 
own costs« The grounds for this stipulation are that the 
matter has been fully compromised and settled between plaintiff 
Trail Mountain and defendant Nevada Power. 
DATED this /fc ^  day of August, 1985. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By t^Si.LL 
D William B. Bohling 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CLYDE & 
Elliott L6e^Pratt 
Edwin Co Barnes 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Nevada Power Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 1SG5, 
I caused to be delivered by hand, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Stipulation of Dismissal to: 
Elliott Lee Pratt, Esq. * E K l « K £ £ £ , 
CLTOE S ' P S S " U N m ° D | T ^ S T C 0 , : a T 
77 West 200 South #200 i*»m*i ur u.MM S a l t Lake City, Utah 84101 gy A [ ,i 
tJERJTY C J ^ P K 
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APPENDIX 8 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
William B. Bohling 
Randall N. Skanchy 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA POWER COMPANY, a 
Nevada corporation, and 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, a 
Pennsylvania corporation 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C-84-0686G 
Based on a stipulation of Plaintiff and Defendant 
Nevada Powe.: Company, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the above-entitled action, 
including the Amended Complaint and Amended Counterclaim on 
file herein and all claims made by plaintiff Trail Mountain 
Coal Company ("Trail Mountain") against defendant Nevada Power 
Company, and defendant Nevada Power Company against plaintiff 
-2-
Trail Mountain, be, and hereby are, dismissed with prejudice 
with each party to bear its own costs. 
Based on Defendant Atlantic Richfield1s motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint for lack of diversity 
jurisdiction, and Plaintiff's motion to drop Atlantic Richfield 
as a party, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Amended Complaint on 
file herein and all claims made by plaintiff Trail Mountain 
against Defendant Atlantic Richfield Company, be, and hereby 
are dismissed without prejudice with each party to bear its own 
costs. 
DATED this / \6 ~*~ day of August, 1985. 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
, i 8 j ^ 
'. /Thomas Greene 
A*4*^ 
APPROVED: 
JO»ES, WALDO, HOLFROOK & McDONOUGH 
ns^ji^ 
ATTEST: A TRUE COPY 
PAW. L BADGER, CLERK 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BY JL?^}^ 
William B. Bohling 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CLYDE & PRATT 
''4t#/£s^ s?6K 
Elliott Lee^Pratt 
Attorneys for Defendant Nevada Power 
r*^mrsa r\\T 
APPENDIX 9 
RULE 26, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
(d) Public Officers; Death or Separation From Office. When a public officer 
is a party to an action and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise 
ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or 
against his successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it is 
satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so 
continuing and maintaining i t Substitution pursuant to this rule may be 
made when it is shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an 
officer adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his 
predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, 
unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the 
application therefor and accorded'an opportunity to object. 
I General Consideration. 
II. Death. 
L GENERAL CONSIDERATION defendant died and his death was immediately 
noted upon the court record, but plaintiff never 
o * C i ^ m™A11^d V' A i l r e d ' 1 2 U t a h 2 d 3 2 5 , m o v e d f o r a substitution of parties nor asked 
3 6 6 R 2 d 4 7 8 ( 1 9 6 1 )
* for an enlargement of the 90-day period within 
II. DEATH which to seek substitution, it was not error for 
the trial court to dismiss the complaint. 
No error in dismissing complaint for Connelly v. Rathjen, 547 P.2d 1336 (Utah 
failure to move to substitute. Where a 1976). 
PART V. 
DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY, 
Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery, 
(a) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the 
following methods: Depositions upon oral examination or written questions; 
written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to 
enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical 
and mental examinations; and requests for admission. Unless the court orders 
otherwise under subdivision (c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these 
methods is not limited. 
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in 
accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(1) In General Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not 
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery, or to the claim or defense of any other party, including 
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground 
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial 
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if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
(2) Insurance Agreements. A party may obtain discovery of the 
existence and contents of any insurance agreement under which any 
person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or 
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or 
reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Information 
concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure 
admissible in evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an 
application for insurance shall not be treated as part of an insurance 
agreement. 
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivi-
sion (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another 
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his 
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a 
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without 
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required 
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney 
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. 
Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required 
showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previ-
ously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move 
for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For purposes of this 
paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement 
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the person making it, or (B) a 
stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription 
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by 
the person making it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions 
held by experts under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule may 
be obtained only as follows: 
(A) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an 
expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party 
in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial only as provided 
by Rule 35 or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under 
which the party seeking discovery is not able to obtain the discovery 
of requested facts or opinions on the same subject by other means, or 
otherwise upon a showing that manifest injustice would result unless 
discovery is permitted. 
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(B) If discovery is permitted under Rule 26 (b) (4) (A), (i) the court 
shall, unless manifest injustice would result, require that the party 
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in 
responding to discovery; and (ii) the court may require the party 
seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and 
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts 
and opinions from the expert. 
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is 
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the 
following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had 
only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or 
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other 
than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not 
be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain 
matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons 
designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only 
by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only 
in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified 
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as 
directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court 
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person 
provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award 
of expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and Timing of Discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for 
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that 
a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not 
operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of Responses. A party who has responded to a request 
for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty 
to supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except 
as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with 
respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity 
of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the 
subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he 
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the 
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response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response 
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are 
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing 
concealment. 
(3) A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the 
court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new 
requests for supplementation of prior responses. 
(f) Deposition Where Action Pending in Another State. Any party to an 
action or proceeding pending in another state, may take the deposition of any 
person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same 
conditions and limitations as if such action or proceeding were pending in this 
state; provided, that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of 
such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which 
the person whose deposition is to be taken resides or is to be served; and 
provided further that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition 
which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be 
submitted to the court in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Scope of Discovery. 
A. In General. 
B. Insurance Agreements. 
C. Trial Preparationc 
1. Materials. 
2. Experts. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION 
The purposes of discovery rules are to 
make discovery as simple and efficient as 
possible by eliminating any useless ritual, 
undue rigidities or technicalities which may 
have become engrafted in the law, and to 
remove elements of surprise or trickery so that 
the parties and the court can determine the 
facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly 
and expeditiously as possible. Ellis v. Gilbert, 
19 Utah 2d 189,429 P.2d 39 (1967). 
Rule applicable to action to remove pub-
lic official for malfeasance. The taking of 
depositions pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is applicable in an action to remove 
a public official from office for malfeasance 
pursuant to § 77-7-2, U.C.A. 1953. State v. 
Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961). 
Cited in Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1977). 
II. SCOPE OF DISCOVERY 
A. In General 
Discovery should be liberally permitted 
where it is used in eliminating non- controver-
sial matters and in identifying, narrowing and 
clarifying the issues on which contest may 
prove to be necessary. State ex rel. Road 
Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 
(1966). 
But not so as to yield a "fishing expedi-
tion." The use of discovery should not be 
extended to permit ferreting unduly into de-
tail, nor to have the effect of cross-examining 
the opposing party or his witnesses, nor should 
it be distorted into a "fishing expedition." State 
ex reL Road Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 
412 P.2d 914 (1966). 
Any matter which will help resolve a 
lawsuit is "relevant." The ultimate objective 
of any lawsuit is a determination of the dispute 
between the parties, and whatever helps to 
attain that objective is "relevant" to the law-
suit. Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 
39(1967). 
B. Insurance Agreements 
Insurance agreements discoverable. 
Through discovery, a plaintiff should have 
some means of discovering whether an insur-
ance policy exists and what its provisions are, 
so that he can know whether covenants upon 
which his rights may depend are being com-
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